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s Acronyms
AGLINK OECD Partial Equilibrium Model
BuR Bulgaria and Rumania
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CAPRI Common Agricultural Policy Regionalised Impact Modelling System
 (www.capri-model.org)
ESU Economic Size Unit
ESC Economic Size Class
EU  European Union 
EUROSTAT  Statistical Office of the European Communities
EU-02 Bulgaria and Romania
EU-10  Member States that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004
EU-15  Member States of the European Union before 1 May 2004 
EU-25  Member States of the European Union before 1 January 2007 
EU-27  European Union after the enlargement on 1 January 2007 
FADN  Farm Accountancy Data Network
FSS  Farm Structure Survey
GAEC Good agricultural and environmental condition
IPTS Institute for Prospective Technological Studies
LU Livestock Standard Unit
LDC Least developed countries
EBA Everything-But-Arms Initiative
ACP African, Caribbean, and Pacific states that are associated with the European Union
 through the Lomé Convention
MS  Member State(s)
NMS New Member State(s)
NPK  Nitrogen, Phosphate and Potassium
NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
Nuts1 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics Level 1
Nuts2 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics Level 2
REGIO  Abbreviation for the regional domain at EUROSTAT
UAA Utilised Agricultural Area
SAPS Single Area Payment Scheme
SPS Single Payment Scheme (synonym includes SAPS, historic and regional SPS)
WTO World Trade Organisation
GSP  General System of Preferences
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CAPRI farm type layer: Synonym for the CAPRI model system when applied using the 1823 farm type 
supply models instead of the 270 regional Nuts2 supply models.
A farm type is a single supply model in the CAPRI. With the exception of the residual farm type, each 
farm type is characterised by one particular type of farming (13 aggregates) and economic size class (3 
aggregates). A farm type also has a regional dimension, which refers to the MS and sub-regional level of 
Nuts2. 
A MS-aggregated farm type is an aggregate of farm types for one particular MS by type of farming and 
economic size class.
An EU-aggregated farm type is an aggregate of farm types in the EU-25/15/10 by type of farming and 
economic size class.
The baseline is the comparison point for counterfactual scenario analysis. For the current study, the 
baseline is calibrated for the year 2020 based on trend estimation using ex-post data and projections. 
The base year is the most recent year available from official statistics.
Bound tariffs are those tariffs that beyond which a country – particularly in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) context – has agreed to not increase the rate of duty. These tariffs are also known as Most Favoured 
Nations (MFN) tariffs. 
Applied tariffs are those that are actually applied by the country concerned. They may be the bound rate, 
but frequently they are not. 
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sisExecutive Summary
Section 1: Introduction
1. This study presents a quantitative policy impact analysis of alternative policy and macroeconomic 
assumptions in the agricultural farming sector. Three scenarios are considered: direct payment 
scenario, macroeconomic environment scenario and WTO scenario. The impact analyses are based 
on the partial equilibrium CAPRI model. Unlike other CAPRI studies, we use the specific farm module 
of CAPRI called CAPRI farm type (CAPRI FT) to complement the regional scenario analyses with 
farm-level analyses. A unique characteristic of the farm-type component is its full integration into 
the CAPRI modelling chain, which ensures price feedback based on sequential calibration with the 
global, large-scale market model.
2. The CAPRI farm type comprises a maximum of nine of the most important farm types per Nuts2 region 
plus a residual farm type that altogether represents the total regional production as well as input 
use. The nine farm groups are characterised along two dimensions: “type of farming”, determined by 
the farm’s production specialisation and “economic size class” of the farm, represented in terms of 
“European size units”. This scheme results in 1823 farm supply models.
3. Equalisation of the large differences in decoupled payments between farms in the form of a flat-rate 
scheme within the EU Member States and across the EU as a whole is currently being extensively 
discussed in the context of the ongoing debate on the post-2013 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
The objective of the first direct payment scenario is to investigate the potential distributional and 
market impacts of the implementation of more equitable decoupled payment schemes.
4. The food crisis in 2007/2008 demonstrated that agricultural prices are responsive to macro-level 
pressures, such as crude-oil price changes and economic growth. In the second macroeconomic 
environment scenario, we investigate the impact of recovery from the economic crises on the farming 
sector.
5. Liberalisation of international trade is the major topic of the current WTO round, and although the 
negotiations appear to be far from reaching an agreement, the third WTO scenario aims to quantify the 
impact of a proposal made by the chair of the WTO’s agriculture negotiations, Ambassador Crawford 
Falconer, in December 2008 (WTO, 2008).
Section 2: Baseline
6. The CAPRI baseline in 2020 is used as the comparison point for the scenarios, and its construction 
relies on a combination of three information sources: the AGLINK baseline, an analysis of historical 
trends and expert information. The CAPRI baseline includes recent assumptions about macroeconomic 
drivers, such as GDP, population, oil price and the evolution of the CAP, in particular the expiration 
of the milk quota system.
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Section 3: Direct payment scenario
7. The first scenario assumes equalisation of decoupled payments – a regional flat-rate scheme – at the 
Nuts1 level. In addition, we simulate a flat-rate payment scheme at the MS and EU levels.
8. The study shows relatively minor allocative market responses and thus small price effects for all three 
sub-scenarios. The market effects are mostly limited to adjustment of land use for those regions loosing 
premiums, and slight substitution effects were observed in regions where premiums are differentiated 
for arable land and grassland. Regions where the premiums increase are bounded by the entitlement 
constraint; therefore, minor market implications exist.
9. Given that the historical and regional SPS models are strictly linked to coupled Pillar I support granted 
under the Agenda 2000, the value of farm payments under these two SPS models reflects to a larger 
extent the production specialisation and productivity of regions. A uniform flat rate tends to reduce 
the support level in more productive regions and increase it in more marginal regions. Income effects 
result mainly from the redistribution of decoupled payments because production and price effects of 
the flat-rate scheme are small, having only minor impacts on farm income.
10. The value of payments reallocated between farms in the EU increases from 9% (3.7 billion €) of the 
total CAP budget in the Nuts1 scenario (in which it mainly occurs in the EU-15 and is driven by MS, 
which implements the historical SPS) to 19% (8.2 billion €) in the EU flat-rate scenario.
11. The scenario analyses show strong heterogeneous impacts of the introduction of the flat rate among 
farm types. Particularly negatively affected categories are large and medium-sized farms and 
dairies, mixed crops and livestock, general field and mixed cropping, olives, cereals and oilseeds 
and permanent crops. Small farms tend to be less affected. However, sheep, goats and grazing, the 
residual farm category  and mixed livestock farms realise higher premiums and incomes.
12. The results reveal substantial redistributional effects within each farm type. Although a farm type 
may lose payments on aggregate, not all individual farms included within this group may suffer. For 
example, dairy farms lose 23.1% (1.133 billion €) of decoupled payments on aggregate in the EU 
flat-rate scenario in the EU-25. Disaggregating this figure, 60% of the farms represented in the group 
realise payment decreases equal to -1.4 billion €, whereas 40% of farms realise a payment increase of 
0.27 billion €.
13. By assumption, the Nuts1 and MS flat rate has minor payment redistributional effects between MS. 
On the contrary, the EU flat-rate scenario has a considerable impact on the redistribution of payments, 
particularly between the old and new MS. In relative terms, the Netherlands (48%), Belgium (45%) 
and Greece (44%) experience the highest relative losses, whereas the highest gains are observed in 
new MS with large land endowments: Latvia (149 %), Romania (92%), Estonia (82%), Bulgaria (55%) 
and Lithuania (54%). However, Portugal (43%) and Spain (35%) also gain considerable additional 
payments through a EU-wide flat-rate scheme because of low initial support levels.
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14. The focus of this scenario is the unique link between a spatial global market model and the farm 
type supply models. This scenario aims to quantify the impact of a proposal made by the chair of the 
WTO’s agriculture negotiations, Ambassador Crawford Falconer, in December 2008. He proposed 
a general tariff reduction based on a tiered formula, a reduction of the TRQ in quota tariffs and the 
possibility to exclude certain products, called sensitive products, at the cost of the extension of tariff 
rate quotas for the sensitive-product imports.
15. The simulation results show that tariff reduction increases consumer welfare in the EU by 8.5 billion €, 
whereas agricultural income decreases by 6.8 billion € (-3%), mainly driven by losses realised in the 
animal sector that account for 5.5 billion €.
16. Reduced trade protection increases imports and decreases producer and market prices in the EU, in 
particular for sugar (14%) and beef (13%) but also for butter (10%), cream (5%) and other fruits (5%).
17. The simulation shows that these price reductions translate into relatively small changes in agricultural 
production of between 0% and -4% relative to the baseline level. Despite the moderate production 
change, price reductions directly affect the farm income available to pay for the primary factors such 
as land and labour.
18. The analysis shows sizable impacts on farm income for different farm types. Generally, farm types 
specialised in livestock production lose the most. The largest negative income effects were observed 
for cattle; dairying, rearing and fattening; dairy; mixed crops, livestock; and sheep and goat farm 
types.
Section 5: Macroeconomic Environment Scenario
19. The macroeconomic environment is an important factor in determining the agricultural sector’s 
development. We simulate the farm-level effects of a hypothetical economic recovery scenario that 
may lead to higher GDP growth and higher oil prices. We assume two shocks: an increase in the 
crude oil price by 50% and an annual world GDP growth rate increase of 1% (or 16% cumulative) 
compared to baseline.
20. In general, the considered shocks lead to higher commodity prices, and the oil price shock also 
causes higher production costs. An increase in the annual world GDP growth rate by 1% relative to 
baseline causes stronger price effects than does the 50% increase in the oil price.
21. With the oil price shock, farmers are affected by two opposing market effects: an increase in production 
costs and an increase in revenues. In most cases, increasing costs dominate such that the overall farm 
income declines.
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22. The effect of higher GDP on income across farm types is generally positive due to the increasing 
demand for agricultural products, which generates an increase in the prices of agricultural commodities. 
Farmers react to the new macro environment with adjustments of their production. Thus, the effect 
of the increased GDP leads to an increase in arable land and intensification of crop and animal 
production activities. Furthermore, a tendency to substitute grassland for arable land can be observed, 
particularly in farms other than those specialised in cattle or sheep and goat production.
17
Fa
rm
 le
ve
l p
ol
ic
y 
sc
en
ar
io
 a
na
ly
sisI. Introduction 
Project objective
Consistent with the invitation to tender IPTS-
2009-J05-54-RC-AMI, three policy scenarios are 
evaluated in this report. First, the direct payment 
scenario is simulated. This scenario investigates 
the impact of changing from the historical/
hybrid SPS model to a regional SPS model. In the 
second macroeconomic environment scenario, 
the recovery from the economic crises and its 
impact on the agricultural sector are analysed. 
The third scenario investigates the impact of a 
WTO proposal. In addition to scenario analysis, 
the modelling of the CAPRI farm type layer is 
improved, and the base year data is updated 
using the most recent available FSS and FADN 
data. The baseline has been updated for the year 
2020, and it is used as a counterfactual situation 
for the scenario analysis. The report begins with 
the background description of the CAPRI farm 
type development conducted within this project, 
followed by an overview of its characteristics 
and limitations. Chapter 2 introduces the CAPRI 
baseline. In Chapter 3, the three scenarios are 
described, results presented and conclusions 
drawn. 
Background 
The CAPRI modelling system was originally 
developed to analyse policies at the regional 
level in Europe. Mathematical programming (MP) 
models were chosen to model policy-induced 
production changes. Since then, these supply 
models have been extended continually, now 
covering the EU-27, Norway, the Western Balkans 
and Turkey with 273 mathematical programming 
(MP) models. They are defined at the level of 
administrative units (Nuts2). The mathematical 
programming models are conceptually an 
effective device for explicitly modelling policy 
interventions at the farm level, but policies at the 
market level, such as tariffs, are modelled with 
the spatial, global, multi-commodity model for 
agricultural products. This market model covers 
60 countries in 28 trade blocks worldwide. Three 
trading regions cover the EU, namely the EU-15, 
EU-10 as well as Bulgaria and Rumania (BuR). 
The market model is a partial equilibrium 
model, whereas the supply for the three 
European regions is simulated by the 273 supply 
programming models. To link the supply and 
the market models, the behavioural parameters 
for supply and feed demand for the countries 
covered by the supply model are sequentially 
updated based on the results of the market 
model. This design makes it possible to explicitly 
define policies in the mathematical programming 
models for the EU while allowing for endogenous 
for agricultural products. One should note that 
the market model also simulates the demand in 
the EU and supply, feed and processing demand 
and human consumption based on specific 
functional forms for all non-EU regions modelled. 
An iterative approach is used to balance supply 
and demand. It starts by using a given price, 
simulating an EU-wide supply and introducing 
the supply changes in the form of shocks in the 
supply part of the market model to obtain a 
new price. The price is used as an input for the 
mathematical supply models, and this process is 
repeated until supply and demand are balanced.
The shift from market to direct payment 
support starting with the 1992 reform and 
the introduction of farm-specific premium 
schemes (e.g., stocking densities and decoupled 
payments) motivated the development of a tool 
that is disaggregated at the farm level and is 
thus able to capture these changes in policies. A 
farm type module was introduced in the CAPRI 
model using the FADN (Farm Accountancy Data 
18
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The FADN is the database most frequently used 
to source EU farm type models. It comprises 
single-farm observations of commercial farms 
on production and sales values, production 
activity levels, yields for selected activities 
and input costs as well as information about 
prices, subsidy payments, farm income and 
other financial and economic variables. The 
definitions in FADN are harmonised by EU 
legislation, which also requires yearly updates 
of the survey from the EU Member States. 
The FADN, however, only covers a sample of 
farms with aggregation weights attached, with 
a somewhat low representativeness for less 
frequent farm types and production activities. 
The second data source, the FSS, mainly reports 
data on the production activities based on a 
sub-survey every third year and a complete 
survey every tenth year. Both data sets exclude 
small farms based on minimum economic 
thresholds that vary among Member States, with 
lower thresholds in the FSS and thus, better 
representation compared to the FADN. Similarly, 
some enterprises, such as highly commercialised 
farms, are not obligated to provide accounting 
information to the FADN but are included in the 
FSS. The access to FADN and FSS data and the 
support of several previous research projects1 
made it possible to successfully develop farm 
group supply models within the CAPRI modelling 
framework. The farm groups are called “farm 
types”, and the module is called the CAPRI 
farm type layer (CAPRI-FT), which consists of 
1823 farm supply models. The farm type layer 
mainly aims to capture heterogeneity in farming 
specialisation and economic size within a region 
to reduce aggregation bias in the response of the 
agricultural sector to policy and market signals. 
This model extension is especially important 
when the simulated policy instruments are farm 
specific, as is the case of the historical SPS, or 
when the instruments are modulated depending 
on farm characteristics. Additionally, the farm 
1 http://www.capri-model.org/projects.htm
type layer might allow future extension of the 
model to account for farm structural change.
Characteristics of the farm type layer in 
CAPRI
One important characteristic of the CAPRI-
FT is its full integration in the CAPRI modelling 
chain, which ensures that price feedback is based 
on sequential calibration with the global, large-
scale market model (Table 1). 
Endogenous prices in the CAPRI-FT are 
an important advantage relative to other farm 
models used in the literature. In general, other 
EU farm models, such as the AROPAj system 
(Baranger et al., 2008), FARMIS (Offermann et 
al., 2005) and LUAM (Jones et al., 1995), are 
representative models for a given EU region. 
They are simulated based on mathematical 
modelling and are sourced from the FADN 
database (similar to CAPRI-FT), but an important 
weakness is that these models are stand-alone 
supply models in which prices are assumed to be 
exogenous. Linking the farm models to existing 
market models is a challenging task due to data 
gaps, differences in product definitions, and the 
mismatch between data sets that are available 
at the farm level and the underlying market-
level data. The strict and consistent top-down 
consistency of the farm type layer available in 
CAPRI-FT ensures a harmonised data set across 
regional scales and farm types.
The farm type supply module in CAPRI 
consists of independent aggregate nonlinear 
programming models for each farm type 
aggregated over all activities belonging to a given 
farm type and a specific administrative regional 
unit at the Nuts2 level. In this approach, there is 
a compromise between a pure LP approach and 
the fully econometrically estimated one. The 
compromise is achieved by combining a Leontief 
technology for variable costs, covering low- and 
high-yield variants for the different production 
activities, with a partly econometrically estimated 
19
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behavioural function (Jansson and Heckelei, 
2011) based on the positive mathematical 
programming (PMP) approach (Howitt, 1995). 
The nonlinear cost function captures the effects 
of labour and capital on farmers’ decisions. Its 
advantage is that it allows perfect calibration 
of the supply models and smooth simulation of 
responses to policy changes. The farm models, 
similar to the regional models, capture the 
premiums paid under the CAP in great detail; 
they include NPK balances and a module with 
feeding activities that accounts for the nutrient 
requirements of animals. In addition to the feed 
constraint, other model constraints relate to 
land supply and subsitution between grass and 
arable land. Prices are exogenous in the supply 
module, but they are endogenously determined 
by the market module in an iterative process 
solved between the supply and market modules 
until convergence is reached. Grass, silage 
and manure are assumed to be non-tradable 
and are assigned internal prices based on their 
substitution values and opportunity costs. 
The CAPRI farm type module comprises 
a maximum of nine of the most important farm 
types per region plus a residual farm type, 
altogether representing total regional production 
as well as input and primary factor use. The 
nine farm groups are characterised along two 
dimensions (Table 2): (i) by the “type of farming”, 
determined by the farm production specialisation, 
as defined by the relative contributions of 
different production branches to the gross margin 
Table 1: Overview of CAPRI - farm type model characteristics
Type of model Independent aggregate non linear programming models
Components of the model Compromise between a pure LP approach and the fully econometrically estimated 
one, extending PMP
 Objective function Maximizing differences between revenues plus premiums minus variable cost and a 
cost component from the quadratic cost function
 Capital and Labour Effects of labour and capital on farmers decisions caught by the cost function
 Land Endogenous land supply function consists of a three-tier land allocation model that 
allocates between agricultural land and land for other uses (e.g., grassland versus 
arable land) and allocates by land use based on various crop and grassland intensities
 Nutrient balance NPK balances; feeding activities covering nutrient requirements of animals
 Constraints Feed block, total land use, set-aside obligations and quotas
Prices 
 tradable products Are exogenous in the supply module and are provided by the market module, with 
which they are solved sequentially until convergence.
 non-tradable products Grass, silage and manure are assumed to be non-tradable and receive internal prices 
based on their substitution value and opportunity costs
Calibration of the base year The cost function allows both for perfect calibration of the models and a smooth 
simulation response
Farm Types in CAPRI
 Total No. EU-25 1823
 Total no.of supply models 1888
 No.per Nuts2 Maximum of nine of the most important farm types per region plus a residual farm 
group
Integration into CAPRI
 Methodology Full integration in the CAPRI modelling chain, which ensures price feedback based on 
sequential calibration with the global, large-scale market model, strict and consistent 
top-down disaggregation approach in the baseline; obtaining a harmonised data set 
across regional scales and farm types
 IT Where possible, CAPRI-FT uses the same GAMS routines as the regional supply 
models
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of the farm (European Commission, CD 85/377/
EEC, Article 6) and (ii) the “economic size class” 
of the farm, represented in terms of “European 
size units” (ESU). The EU classification scheme 
allows for a far more detailed characterisation 
of a farm’s specialisation. The choice of 13 farm 
specialisations is a compromise between model 
complexity, robustness of the result, reporting 
limitations and data constraints. In particular, the 
data confidentiality issues that are highlighted 
when using more disaggregated types in regional 
aggregates render it suitable to adhere to the 
classification shown in Table 2. Additionally, 
higher farm disaggregation would increase the 
complexity of the results without adding value in 
terms of policy-relevant reporting of the model 
results. Similar arguments support the use of only 
three economic farm size classes (ESC), defined 
as ESC 1 for farms smaller than 16 ESU, ESC 2 for 
farms of at least 16 ESU but less than 100 ESU, 
and ESC 3 for farms of 100 ESU or larger. In total, 
this leads to 13*3=39 cells in the overall farm 
typology. 
From these 39 possible farm types, up to 
9 of the most important farm types are selected 
in each Nuts2 region. The farm selection is 
based on two criteria: livestock units (LU) and 
utilised agricultural area (UAA). Both criteria 
were assigned equal priority (equal weights) in 
determining the importance of each farm type. 
Compared to other weighting systems based 
on the number of farms, economic indicators, 
area farmed or livestock numbers, this approach 
provides a compromise between the economic, 
social and environmental aspects of farming. For 
further information on the methodology of the 
construction of the farm type layer, see Gocht 
(2010a), (2010b) and Gocht and Britz (2011). 
The farms that are not represented by the 9 most 
important farm types are included in the residual 
farm type. The restriction to 10 farm groups 
(the 9 most important groups plus the residual 
farm group) per region is based on storage and 
computing time considerations as well as the 
need to keep the database and model outputs at 
a manageable size for quality control and result 
analysis.
The CAPRI supply module covers 27 EU 
Member States and nine non-EU countries, each 
of which are split into several Nuts2 sub-regions. 
With the introduction of the farm type layer, 
a Nuts2 region has at most 10 farm types. The 
CAPRI-FT covers the EU-25, whereas BuR, due to 
missing FADN statistics, are represented only by 
the Nuts2 supply models. In summary, there are 
1,888 mathematical supply models for the EU-27 
in total; 1,823 are farm type models for the EU-
25, and 65 are Nuts2 supply models for BuR. 
Table 2: Types of farming and economic size classes for the farm types
Type of farming Economic size class 
Specialist cereals, oilseed and protein crops 13 ESC 1 < 16 ESU
General field cropping + Mixed cropping 14_60 ESC 2 ≥ 16 ≤ 100 ESU
Specialist horticulture 20 ESC 3 > 100 ESU
Specialist vineyards 31
Specialist fruit and citrus fruit 32
Specialist olives 33
Various permanent crops combined 34
Specialist dairying 41
Specialist cattle + dairying rearing,  fattening 42_43
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 44
Specialist granivores 50
Mixed livestock holdings 70
Mixed crops-livestock 80
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One of the main drawbacks of the CAPRI-
FT approach is the use of structurally identical, 
stylised and relatively simple template models in 
which differences between farm types and regions 
are expressed solely by parameters. This approach 
might not completely capture the full diversity 
of farming systems in Europe. In particular, the 
evaluation of policy measures that impact farm 
management decisions, such as manure handling 
or feeding practices, demands models that 
include these factors as decision variables. The 
relatively simple representation of agricultural 
technology in CAPRI compared to approaches 
that are parameterised based on biophysical 
models narrows the scope of extensions in that 
direction. The potential of the current template 
has not yet been fully exploited in CAPRI, 
although the dichotomy between increased detail 
for specific activities, regions and farm types and 
a structurally identical template model remains. 
Updating and maintaining a regional database 
with an additional breakdown by farm type 
requires more resources, as does the application 
of the enlarged simulation tool.
Scenario application with the farm type 
layer in this study 
The scenarios make use of the farm type 
layer with respect to the explicit and detailed 
implementation of the SPS (single payment 
scheme) at the farm type level. Farm-related 
premium, income and cost effects can thus be 
analysed also with respect to the type of farming 
and the economic size. The top-down Pillar 1 
distribution, considering the ceilings values from 
the regulatory texts, across the sector, regions and 
farm types, provides a complete picture of the 
premium distribution. In addition, the economic 
model available behind each farm type ensures 
that policy impacts on land rents and land-
use changes can be analysed. This capability is 
particularly relevant for the flat-rate scenario. 
In addition, the unique link between the farm 
supply models and the agricultural trade model 
is used to analyse the full range of tariff cuts and 
CAP measures in the macroeconomic and WTO 
scenarios at the farm level. For example, in the 
macroeconomic scenario, impacts of higher GDP 
growth world wide on global and EU agricultural 
markets are simulated. This effect, in turn, affects 
income, production, and input use at the farm 
level. Note that the response behaviour of the 
CAPRI farm type model also changes as compared 
to the CAPRI Nuts2 regional model due to a 
reduced aggregation error. Farm supply models 
behave more restrictively than the Nuts2 supply 
models. Typically, each individual farm type 
model comprises less activities and thus a smaller 
production possibility set compared to the more 
aggregated NUTS2 models. For example, a farm 
type specialised in cereals, oilseed and protein 
cannot easily change production specialisation 
(e.g., to a sheep and goat farm type) due to 
restrictions in land endowment, education, 
machinery and other farm resources, even in 
the presence of price and/or policy incentives. 
However, if modelled at the regional Nuts2 level, 
the farm would be less restricted in its ability 
to adjust its production behaviour because the 
constraints are aggregated over all farms in the 
region, thus making more resources available for 
all of the production activities in the region.
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An important component of the scenario 
analysis is the CAPRI baseline. The baseline is 
used as a comparison point for the scenarios. 
Assumptions underlying and information 
included in the baseline are discussed in 
this chapter. First, we briefly motivate the 
methodology and provide an overview of 
the different policy and macroeconomic 
assumptions. A detailed description can be 
found in Britz & Witzke (2009). The CAPRI 
baseline construction relies on a combination 
of three information sources: the AGLINK 
baseline2, an analysis of historical trends 
and expert information. The most relevant 
information is a preliminary AGLINK baseline 
prepared for this project at the IPTS in 
October 2009. It includes recent assumptions 
on macroeconomic drivers, such as GDP, 
population, oil price and the evolution of the 
CAP, in particular the expiry of the milk quota 
system. Important economic variables from 
the baseline are summarised in Table 3.
2 BLANCO FONSECA, M., ET AL.: IPTS Agro-Economic 
Modeling Platform: Bio fuel Modeling (AGLINK, ESIM, 
CAPRI). JRC - IPTS, Seville, 2009
Table 3: Comparison between base year and baseline
Base year 2005 Baseline 2020
Political variables
 Milk Quota EU-25 in million tonnes 133 -
 Sugar Quota EU-27 in 1.000 tonnes 17.000 12.400
Macroeconomic Assumptions (EU-27)
 Population growth in % p.a.  - 0,04%
 Crude oil price in $ per barrel 38 104
 Inflation in % p.a.  - 1,90%
Other Trends (EU-27)
 New energy crops second generation in 1.000 hectares 0 1.500
Prices for important products (EU-27, €/t)
 Cereals 104 140
 Oilseeds 202 224
 Beef 1.714 2.507
 Dairy products 1.282 1.393
Struktural change
 EU-25 No. of Holdings in Mio 10,2
constant EU-15 No. of Holding in Mio 6,6
 EU-10 No. of Holding in Mio 3,6
Land Use (EU27, 1000 ha)
 Used Agricultural Area 191.272 187.419
 Pasture 65.309 64.910
 Arable land 125.962 122.509
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Because the regional resolution of the 
AGLINK baseline is limited to EU aggregates, the 
baseline draws additionally on national expert 
information. Furthermore, the baseline includes 
specific expert information from the PRIMES 
energy model for the bio-fuel sector and expert 
projections from the seed manufacturer KWS for 
the sugar sector. Trends and expert information 
combined might be inconsistent and might violate 
basic technical constraints, such as crop area 
and/or young animal balances. Consequently, 
all expert information is usually provided in the 
form of target values. For consistency reasons 
(such as production quantity equalisation with 
activity levels and yields), deviations from target 
values are allowed; however, to avoid large 
deviations, they are penalised during the model 
estimation process. Another important input into 
the baseline constructions is detailed information 
on policy measures. The policy assumptions 
complete the definition of the CAPRI baseline 
and, together with other data, form the basis of 
parameter calibration. The baseline represents the 
starting point (the counterfactual situation) for the 
subsequent scenario analysis. Table 4 provides an 
overview of the policy reforms implemented in 
the baseline for this study. 
Table 5 summarises the total direct payments 
on gross value added amongst MS aggregated 
according to baseline farm types.
Special characteristics of farm types
We now briefly discuss additional 
assumptions made for the farm type baseline. 
Generally, it would be desirable to distinguish two 
different forms of development in the baseline 
projections for particular farm types: production 
development (crop allocation and animal herd 
size) of each farm type and composition, which 
is the number of farms in a group. This distinction 
is not possible with the current version, but the 
Table 4: Policies included at baseline
Baseline 2020
Common Agriculturel Policy Reforms
.. of the Milk Market milk quota removed
.. of Mid Term Review historical SPS, flat-rate and SAPS for new MS 
.. of the Sugar Market
Reform of the CMO sugar of 2006 implemented. Sugar quotas fixed on the 2009 values. 
Ethanol beets introduced
.. Helth Check 
further decoupling of payments for olive and hops; beef and veal, protein crops, rice; 
removal set aside obligation; increase of modulation distributed over four steps beginning in 
2009;
Table 5: Overview of pillar 1 payments at baseline for different EU aggregates
EU-27 EU-25 EU-15 EU-10 Bulgaria Romania
€ Million
Sum of Pillar I Payments 42.919 40.406 33.918 6.489 810 1.703
coupled (partially)
 Wine sector 352 352 352
 Suckler cow premium 1.171 1.171 1.171
 Sheep and goat 394 394 394
decoupled
 Single area payment scheme SAPS 8.855 6.342 6.342 810 1.703
 Regional flat rate premium flat-rate SPS 9.018 9.018 9.018
 Farm specific payment historical SPS 22.746 22.746 22.600 146
 Hybrid premium farm flat-rate + historical SPS 382 382 382
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will address these shortcomings is foreseen within 
the medium-term development of the system. 
The main constraint for this development is the 
missing time-series data for the evaluation of farm 
groups and their production structures to build 
trend forecasts and expectations for baseline 
routines. Accordingly, a different approach has 
been chosen in the current version. The prior 
information is obtained by multiplying the base 
period value of a variable of interest (e.g., hectares 
for a crop, herd sizes, input-output coefficients) 
for a given farm type by the ratio between the 
projected value at the Nuts2 level and the Nuts2 
base year value of the variable. The following 
consistency conditions are imposed during the 
projection, similar to those used at the Nuts2 level: 
(1) production and total input use are derived 
from activity levels and input-output coefficients; 
(2) the UAA must equal the sum of the crop 
area; (3) nutrient requirements (protein, energy, 
different types of fibre) for each animal must be 
in balance with the deliveries from feeding; (4) 
own-produced fodder (grass, silage maize, fodder 
root crops, and other fodder from arable land) 
must be used within the same farm type; (5) the 
sum of the crop area and the animals across all 
farm types must equal Nuts2 values; (6) the sum 
of the production and input use across all farm 
types must be equal to Nuts2 values; and (7) the 
weighted average of feed input coefficients must 
be equal to those observed at the Nuts2 level. The 
Table 6: Indicators for different EU-25 aggregated farm types
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Type of Farming No. Million No. Million No. Million
 Cereals, oilseed & protein crops 245 32,20 1,00 2,10 173 25,60 0,70 1,90 72 6,60 0,30 0,20
 General field & mixed cropping 251 20,00 1,80 3,70 201 14,90 0,90 3,00 50 5,10 0,90 0,70
 Dairying 235 16,90 0,50 19,40 205 15,30 0,40 18,50 30 1,70 0,20 0,90
 Cattle- Dairying -rearing & fattening 149 11,70 0,40 12,00 133 10,90 0,30 11,60 16 0,80 0,10 0,40
 Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 172 15,50 0,50 6,90 159 15,10 0,40 6,80 13 0,40 0,00 0,10
 Granivores 118 2,70 0,20 10,20 76 1,60 0,00 8,80 42 1,00 0,20 1,40
 Mixed livestock holdings 85 5,10 0,50 5,10 53 1,80 0,10 3,00 32 3,30 0,40 2,10
 Mixed crops-livestock 276 19,80 0,90 13,00 214 12,70 0,30 11,00 62 7,10 0,70 2,00
 Vineyards 22 1,40 0,20 0,10 21 1,40 0,20 0,10 1
 Fruit and citrus fruit 13 0,60 0,20 0,10 13 0,60 0,20 0,10
 Olives 25 3,60 0,80 0,20 25 3,60 0,80 0,20
 Permanent crops mixed 16 0,50 0,20 0,10 15 0,50 0,20 0,10 1
 Horticulture 5 0,10 5 0,10
Economic Size Class
 <=16 ESU 486 36,60 6,00 11,90 342 22,40 3,20 7,50 144 14,20 2,70 4,40
 >16 and <=100 ESU 673 56,80 1,00 36,20 602 52,80 1,00 34,70 71 3,90 0,10 1,50
 >100 ESU 453 36,60 0,20 24,80 349 28,80 0,20 22,80 104 7,80 2,00
Residual 211 39,50 3,10 16,60 170 32,70 2,30 15,00 41 6,80 0,80 1,50
Total 1.823 169,40 10,20 89,40 1.463 136,70 6,60 80,00 360 32,80 3,60 9,40
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prior information for the different data elements 
at the farm type level is defined from the base 
year results of each farm type and the projected 
changes over time in the related Nuts2 regions. 
Generally, all variables are solved simultaneously 
to account for the interactions between crops 
and animals in the estimation procedure. The 
boundaries surrounding the prior information 
help to ensure the plausibility of the obtained 
results. Developments in acreage and herd size 
based on farm type at baseline are captured by 
the set of relative changes projected at the Nuts2 
Figure 1: Cropping pattern for EU-25 aggregated farm types and EU-25 total
Figure 2: Herd sizes for EU-25 aggregated farm types and EU-25 total
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are relaxed. The approach guarantees identical 
results for the baseline at the MS and regional 
Nuts2 levels from model versions both including 
and excluding particular farm types.
Table 6 shows the number of farm types 
per type of farming and economic size class 
separately for the EU-25, EU-15 and EU-10. 
In addition, it presents the utilised agricultural 
area (UAA) and the livestock units (LU) of each 
farm type at baseline. In addition, the number of 
holdings each farm type represents is provided. 
This value is obtained from the base year 
statistic. Note that the total numbers in the last 
row of Table 5 are calculated either by adding 
the residual farm type to all type of farming 
rows or by adding the economic size classes. 
The table shows that specialised cereals, oilseeds 
and protein crops are represented in the model 
by 245 supply models, which together represent 
32.2 million hectares UAA and 2.1 million LU. 
In the base year 2005, approximately 1 million 
farms were represented by this type of farming. 
Table 6 also indirectly shows the stocking 
density; in particular, granivores have a very high 
stocking density of 3.7 LU per hectare of UAA.
In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the compositions of 
the different farm types with respect to cropping 
pattern and herd size (in LU) are presented. The 
pie chart in Figure 1 shows the total land use for 
the EU-25. Almost half of the land (84.2 million 
ha) is used for fodder production, which includes 
maize silage, grassland and other fodder on 
arable land. Another 42 million ha are cultivated 
with cereals, 7.9 million ha with fallow land or 
set aside, 14.5 million ha with vegetables, 8.7 
million ha with oilseed and 8.4 million ha with 
other arable crops, such as potatoes, pulses and 
sugar beets. In the bar chart, the first twelve bars 
present the composition of land use per type of 
farming, while the last four present land use with 
respect to the economic size class and for the 
residual farm type. The land use allocation has a 
specific composition in each of the farm types. 
For example, the following farm types mainly 
have fodder area under cultivation: dairying; 
cattle-dairying, rearing and fattening; and sheep, 
goats and other grazing livestock. However, 
cereals and other crops are mostly cultivated in 
specialised cereal farms. Vineyards, fruit, citrus, 
horticulture and permanent crops mixed farm 
types are not often represented as specific farm 
types due to their low importance compared to 
other farm types at the Nuts2 level in terms of 
land use and animal stocking density. These farm 
types are mostly aggregated into the residual farm 
type, as is shown by the high share of permanent 
cropping areas in this farm type. 
Figure 2 characterises animal production 
activities measured in livestock units. The total 
livestock units in the EU-25 are 89.4 million LU 
(se also Table 6). The animal aggregate of cows, 
cattle for raising activities and calf fattening, 
accounts for almost 33 million LU, followed by 
cattle for beef meat production with 23.8 million 
LU and veal production, with 22 million LU.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the 
distribution of the coupled payments per hectare 
of UAA across the EU-27 at baseline. In the EU-
27, all decoupled payments are more than 50 € 
per ha (aggregated at the Nuts2 level). Only the 
Western Balkans (light green area) have a support 
level that is well below this value. 
Several Nuts2 regions in Spain, France, 
Austria, Latvia and Finland (shown in green) have 
payments between 50 and 100 €/ha UAA. Regions 
with a low stocking density and low historical 
yields (EU-15) receive payments below the EU-
27 average of 227 €/ha. The areas represented in 
orange, which are regions with payments greater 
than 100 €/ha but less than 200 €/ha, are below 
the EU-27 average. Many regions in northern 
Spain, the South of France, Scotland, Sweden and 
the majority of regions in the new MS (Poland, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia and Lithuania) 
receive similar levels of payments, indicating that 
a EU-wide flat rate will not only affect regions in 
the new MS but also some regions in Southern 
Europe and Scotland. The blue regions receive 
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payments greater than 200 €/ha and lower than 
350 €/ha. The turquoise areas receive payments 
greater than 350 €/ha and lower than 450 €/ha 
UAA. The Netherlands, southern Italy and Greece 
(olive support) receive the highest payments, at 
more than 450 €/ha.
Figure 3: Distribution of decoupled payments at baseline at the Nuts2 level in €/ha UAA
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For the current study, three scenarios were 
analysed: the direct payment scenario, discussed 
in Section III.1; a macroeconomic scenario, 
discussed in Section III.2; and the WTO proposal, 
discussed in Section III.3.
III.1. Direct Payment Scenario
The first scenario is a regional flat rate 
introduced at the Nuts1 level. In addition, we 
simulated flat-rate premiums at the MS and EU 
levels, as summarised in Table 7. The following 
chapter includes a brief methodological 
description of how the direct payments are 
defined and implemented in the model.
Description 
The SPS is a payment obtained from the 
decoupling of direct premiums from production 
that was introduced as part of the CAP Mid Term 
Review 20033. This payment was distributed to 
farmers in two different ways: 
4
3 The EU flat-rate amount (227 €/ha) is calculated by dividing 
the total EU-27 SPS payments by the UAA at baseline. 
4 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 
September 2003 establishes common rules for direct 
support schemes under the common agricultural policy as 
well as certain support schemes for farmers and amending 
regulations.
•	 First,	 single	 payments	 are	 calculated	 at	
the farm level. Under this scheme, the SPS 
payments remain farm specific and equal the 
value of coupled payments received in the 
reference period. Next, the SPS entitlement 
value per hectare is calculated by dividing 
the reference coupled premium endowment 
by the farm reference area. This SPS model is 
abbreviated as “historic SPS” in this report.
•	 Second,	 the	 total	 amount	 of	 payments	 is	
averaged over a region on a hectare basis. 
The sum of payments received by all farmers 
in a particular area during the reference 
period is divided by the number of eligible 
hectares in that region. This results in a 
uniform hectare premium and is abbreviated 
in this report as “regional SPS”.
The Member States had to opt for one SPS 
category. The regional SPS could be combined 
with a farm-specific top-up, which is known as 
a hybrid SPS scheme. This scheme can be fixed 
or may vary over time, leading to a so-called 
Table 7: Overview of the sub-scenarios for the direct payment scenario
Scenario Description Assumptions
Nuts1 flat rate Regional SPS at the Nuts1 level 
For countries with no Nuts1 region, a regional flat 
rate is applied at the Nuts2 level.
MS flat rate Regional SPS across the country
EU flat rate 227 € per hectare across the EU-274
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fixed or dynamic SPS. In the EU-15, ten MS opted 
solely for the historical SPS, whereas the rest 
opted for the hybrid flat-rate scheme. In the EU-
12, Slovenia and Malta implemented the regional 
SPS from the beginning, whereas the other 
nations implemented the Single Area Payment 
Scheme (SAPS). This is a scheme of a uniform per-
hectare payment similar to the regional SPS but 
without a historical reference area. The SAPS was 
introduced at 25% from the start of accession 
(in 2004 for the EU-10 and 2007 for BuR) and 
gradually increased to 100% over ten years.5
The CAPRI farm type layer allows the shift 
from a historical SPS to a regional SPS to be 
analysed. In countries with a historical SPS, farm 
types have different values for their premium 
rights depending on the production structure and 
coupled payments in the reference period. For 
example, a specialised cattle farm could have 
received more coupled premiums per hectare due 
to higher amounts of coupled cattle premiums 
than another farm type in the region. A shift to 
a flat-rate scheme in the region would decrease 
the payments for the cattle farm but increase 
the payments for other farm types in the region, 
given that the total amount of SPS in the region 
is constant. This result would affect the income 
situation and agricultural markets when land use 
changes occur. Alongside production and input 
effects, the flat-rate scheme also alters prices. 
The price changes are iteratively obtained from 
the market model in the CAPRI. Thus, the aim 
of the scenarios is to analyse the redistribution 
effect and resulting production, price and income 
changes. 
Methodologically, we first calculate 
all premiums given to a farm type based on 
information from legal documents, which are 
mapped onto the production activity units of 
5 Note that the new MS are allowed to grant complementary 
national direct payments (CNDP) to farms up to 30% of the 
total value of the subsidy ceiling. In the CAPRI model, the 
CNDP is assumed to be granted until 2013 in the EU-12 
and until 2016 in BuR and thus is not included in the 2020 
baseline.
the model. The premium amount per production 
activity is then adjusted considering the available 
direct payment ceiling in a given region/MS in 
either monetary terms or in numbers. The SPS 
implementation in the model is achieved as 
follows. The level of decoupling determines the 
total value of SPS in a given region/MS. The total 
SPS value is then averaged over the Nuts1, MS 
or EU, depending on the sub-scenario. During 
the model run, all payments are simulated as 
endogenous contributions to the objective 
function, where the sum of payments over all 
farms is constrained during the iteration to 
comply with regional premium ceiling values. 
For each farm type, entitlements are defined as 
follows: from the reference production in the 
case of MS-15 and from the baseline production 
in the case of MS-10, Bulgaria and Romania. 
If the UAA overshoots the entitlements, the 
next marginal hectare will not receive the flat-
rate premium, and the land market will not 
be affected by the payment. The entitlements 
are assumed to be non-tradable between the 
farm types and regions. Table 8 summarises 
the SPS implementation at baseline and in the 
scenarios. 
In the EU-15, all historical SPS are 
moved to a uniform flat rate. In the EU-10, the 
implementation was not changed for the SAPS, 
with the exceptions of Slovenia and Malta.
Results
We begin with the analysis of the 
redistribution effects of decoupled payments at 
different aggregation levels. Next, we present the 
market impacts of the scenarios on herd sizes, 
cropping and land use and analyse the effects on 
agricultural markets and prices. We finish with 
the farm income analysis.
Redistribution of decoupled payments among 
EU aggregated farm types
Table 9 presents the redistribution of 
decoupled payments between different EU 
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aggregates. At baseline, the spending on 
decoupled payments totals 42.8 billion € in the 
EU-27. The scenario simulations reveal that this 
level of expenditure does not change much at 
the EU-27 level in all three flat-rate schemes 
(-0.7% Nuts1, -0.6% MS and -1% MS flat rate). 
For the Nuts1 and MS flat-rate scenarios, the 
respective changes for the EU-25, EU-15, EU-
10 and BuR are also small. In the EU-15, the 
changes are driven by market effects (e.g., land 
use changes and price changes; see below). 
Most new MS already implement a flat-rate 
system at baseline (except for Slovenia and 
Malta), so there are no redistribution, payment 
and/or market effects. For the EU flat-rate 
scenario, approximately 3.15 billion € are 
redistributed between the EU-15, EU-10 and 
BuR.6 The simulations reveal that the EU-15 
will lose -3.4 billion €, whereas the EU-10 and 
BuR will gain approximately 1 billion € and 
1.94 billion €, respectively.
6 This value is obtained as the sum divided by the absolute 
deviation compared to the baseline and multiplied by 0.5 
to obtain the amount of payment flow between regions.
Table 8: Single payment scheme implementation (baseline and scenarios)
CAPRI Baseline
2020
Direct 
payment 
Scenario
CAPRI Baseline 
2020
Direct payment 
Scenario
Countries
regional 
SPS
historic 
SPS 
Hybrid 
premium 
farm
flat- rate 
SPS
Countries SAPS
regional 
SPS
SAPS
regional 
SPS
EU-15 EU-10
Belgium x x Czech Republic x x
Denmark x x x x Estonia x x
Germany x x Hungary x x
Austria x x Lithuania x x
Netherlands x x Latvia x x
France x x Poland x x
Portugal x x Slovenia x x
Spain x x Slovak Republic x x
Greece x x Cyprus x x
Italy x x Malta x x
Ireland x x
Finland x x x x
Sweden x x x x
United Kingdom x x x x
Table 9: Redistribution of decoupled payments among EU aggregates
EU-Aggregates and MS  
Baseline Nuts1 MS EU Nuts1 MS EU
EU-Aggregate Million € change to Baseline % to Baseline
EU-27 42.834 -320 -244 -430,0 -0,7 -0,6 -1,0
EU-25 40.419 -320 -244 -2.371,6 -0,8 -0,6 -5,9
EU-15 33.953 -318 -243 -3.365,5 -0,9 -0,7 -9,9
EU-10 6.466 -1 -1 994,0 -0,0 -0,0 15,4
Bulgaria 755 0 0 415,1 0,0 0,0 55,0
Romania 1.660 0 0 1.526,4 0,0 0,0 91,9
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In Table 10, the redistribution effects are 
analysed by farming type for the EU-25.7 Note 
that each farm type has a type of farming and 
an economic size class attribute, except for the 
residual farm type. Thus, we can analyse the 
changes by aggregating different types of farming, 
notwithstanding the economic size class, and 
vice versa. The total effects can be obtained 
by considering either all types of farming or all 
economic size classes together with the residual 
farm type.
The level of redistributed payments 
increases with the increasing regional scope 
of the implementation (i.e., Nuts1-MS-EU). In 
relative terms, the biggest gainers are sheep, 
goats and other grazing livestock, vineyards 
and residual farm types. These types receive, 
on average, low levels of initial support per 
7 Bulgaria and Romania have no farm types in the CAPRI-FT; 
thus, they are not included in tables where results for farm 
types are presented.
hectare. The biggest losers are olives and 
permanent crops mixed because of their high 
level of initial support. Other farms that lose 
support are those specialised in cereals, oilseeds 
and protein crops, general field cropping, dairy 
farms and mixed crops and livestock as well as 
large farms. Small farms (less than 16 ESU) are 
affected little by the flat rate, whereas big farms 
lose.
Table 11 further disaggregates the results 
for the EU-15 and EU-10. For the Nuts1 and 
MS flat-rate scenarios, the value of redistributed 
payments is almost zero in the EU-10 because 
of the SAPS, which is also based on a flat-rate 
payment system. The exceptions are Slovenia 
and Malta, which implement the historical 
SPS; thus, small effects are observed in the EU-
10. In the EU-15, the redistributional effects 
are significant because payments vary greatly 
between farms under the SPS. The redistribution 
effects for the EU-15 are similar to the figures 
reported in Table 10.
Table 10: Redistribution of decoupled payments across EU-25 aggregated farm types
EU-25 
Baseline Nuts1 MS EU Nuts1 MS EU
Type of Farming Million € change to Baseline % to Baseline
 Cereals, oilseed & protein crops 7.729 -403 -615 -502,9 -5,2 -8,0 -6,5
 General field & mixed cropping 5.423 -415 -580 -963,0 -7,7 -10,7 -17,8
 Dairying 4.912 -471 -588 -1.133,1 -9,6 -12,0 -23,1
 Cattle- Dairying -rearing & fattening 2.898 124 339 -255,2 4,3 11,7 -8,8
 Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 2.539 560 1.168 971,2 22,1 46,0 38,3
 Granivores 640 -37 -37 -41,7 -5,7 -5,7 -6,5
 Mixed livestock holdings 1.131 -34 -38 19,4 -3,0 -3,4 1,7
 Mixed crops-livestock 5.141 -296 -362 -718,9 -5,8 -7,0 -14,0
 Vineyards 196 111 186 112,5 56,6 95,0 57,5
 Fruit and citrus fruit 106 9 -20 15,9 8,9 -18,6 15,0
 Olives 1.650 -592 -833 -871,7 -35,9 -50,5 -52,8
 Permanent crops mixed 203 -51 -58 -86,9 -25,1 -28,8 -42,9
 Horticulture 12 4 1 -0,6 29,7 4,3 -5,0
Economic Size Class
 <=16 ESU 8.041 -133 101 198,2 -1,7 1,3 2,5
 >16 and <=100 ESU 14.471 -803 -582 -1.769,1 -5,6 -4,0 -12,2
 >100 ESU 10.068 -555 -956 -1.884,1 -5,5 -9,5 -18,7
Residual 7.839 1.171 1.193 1.083,4 14,9 15,2 13,8
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Important regional redistributive effects 
occur in the EU flat-rate scenario. In the EU-
15, almost all farms lose (except for sheep, 
goats and other grazing livestock, vineyards 
and fruit and citrus fruit), whereas in the EU-
10 almost all farms gain (except for permanent 
crops mixed). In Table 9, we report that 
approximately 1 billion € were channelled to 
Table 11: Redistribution of decoupled payments across EU-15/EU-10 aggregated farm types
EU-15 
Baseline Nuts1 MS EU Nuts1 MS EU
Type of Farming Million € change to Baseline % to Baseline
 Cereals, oilseed & protein crops 6.375 -403 -615 -657,8 -6,3 -9,6 -10,3
 General field & mixed cropping 4.450 -421 -586 -1.143,0 -9,5 -13,2 -25,7
 Dairying 4.590 -446 -564 -1.189,4 -9,7 -12,3 -25,9
 Cattle- Dairying -rearing & fattening 2.724 124 340 -261,7 4,6 12,5 -9,6
 Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 2.478 556 1.163 951,0 22,4 47,0 38,4
 Granivores 431 -33 -33 -62,1 -7,6 -7,6 -14,4
 Mixed livestock holdings 501 -36 -40 -110,9 -7,2 -8,1 -22,1
 Mixed crops-livestock 3.728 -300 -366 -919,4 -8,0 -9,8 -24,7
 Vineyards 195 111 186 112,4 56,7 95,3 57,6
 Fruit and citrus fruit 106 9 -20 15,9 8,9 -18,6 15,0
 Olives 1.650 -592 -833 -871,7 -35,9 -50,5 -52,8
 Permanent crops mixed 198 -51 -58 -85,4 -25,7 -29,5 -43,1
 Horticulture 12 4 1 -0,6 29,7 4,3 -5,0
Economic Size Class
 <=16 ESU 5.420 -136 99 -411,5 -2,5 1,8 -7,6
 >16 and <=100 ESU 13.674 -793 -571 -1.870,8 -5,8 -4,2 -13,7
 >100 ESU 8.343 -551 -953 -1.940,4 -6,6 -11,4 -23,3
Residual 6.516 1.161 1.182 857,1 17,8 18,1 13,2
EU-10 
Baseline Nuts1 MS EU Nuts1 MS EU
Type of Farming Million € change to Baseline % to Baseline
 Cereals, oilseed & protein crops 1.355 0 0 154,9 0,0 0,0 11,4
 General field & mixed cropping 973 6 6 180,0 0,6 0,6 18,5
 Dairying 322 -24 -24 56,4 -7,5 -7,5 17,5
 Cattle- Dairying -rearing & fattening 173 -0 -0 6,5 -0,1 -0,1 3,8
 Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 61 4 4 20,1 7,2 7,2 32,8
 Granivores 210 -4 -4 20,5 -1,8 -1,8 9,8
 Mixed livestock holdings 630 2 2 130,3 0,3 0,3 20,7
 Mixed crops-livestock 1.413 4 4 200,5 0,3 0,3 14,2
 Vineyards 1 -0 -0 0,1 -0,0 -0,0 16,3
 Permanent crops mixed 5 0 0 -1,5 0,0 0,0 -34,0
Economic Size Class
 <=16 ESU 2.621 3 3 609,7 0,1 0,1 23,3
 >16 and <=100 ESU 796 -11 -11 101,7 -1,3 -1,3 12,8
 >100 ESU 1.725 -4 -4 56,3 -0,2 -0,2 3,3
Residual 1.323 10 10 226,3 0,8 0,8 17,1
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the EU-10. In particular, big gainers in the EU-
10 are mixed crops and livestock (200 million 
€), general field and mixed cropping (180 
million €), cereals and oilseeds (155 million €) 
and dairy farms (56 million €). Overall, farm 
types in the size class less than 16 ESU in the 
EU-10 benefit, gaining 610 million €. In the 
EU-15, large farms and farms specialised in 
dairying, mixed crops and livestock, general 
field and mixed cropping, olives and cereals 
and oilseeds lose substantially in absolute and 
relative terms.  
Table 10 and Table 11 present the net 
redistribution effects across farm types. 
However, these aggregate changes might hide 
sizable redistribution effects within the farm 
type groups. To gain more insight, Figure 4 to 
Figure 9 report the redistribution of decoupled 
payments within the farm types. The figures show 
the changes in decoupled payments relative 
to the baseline in million € (left panel) and in 
€ per hectare (right panel) for the EU-25. The 
x-axis shows farm groups normalised to 100. 
The left panel is calculated by placing farms in 
ascending order and accumulating the payment 
change compared to the baseline. For the last 
farm, the cumulated value represents the net 
value of redistributed payments over all farms 
considered. The right panel shows the changes 
in the per-hectare value relative to the baseline, 
which, as before, are sorted in ascending order. 
We first show the total effects for all farms (Figure 
4) and then the type of farming that loses most, 
followed by the farm types that benefit (Figure 
5-Figure 9).
First, we consider the distribution for all 
farms. Figure 4 shows that in the Nuts1 scenario, 
almost 30% of all farm types lose payments, 
approximately 30% are not affected (mainly 
those located in new MS and Germany, which 
already implements a flat-rate scheme at baseline) 
and the remaining 30% gain payments. Overall 
(at the endpoint of the curve in Figure 4), farms 
lose 320 million €  (which corresponds to the 
figure reported in Table 9 for the EU-25) in this 
scenario. It can also be observed that for the 
other two sub-scenarios (MS and EU flat rate), the 
net redistribution loss is higher (end points), and 
more farms are affected by the redistribution of 
decoupled payments (the horizontal part of the 
curve is smaller; for the EU flat-rate sub-scenario, 
it almost disappears). In particular, the EU flat-
rate sub-scenario reveals that almost 40% of the 
farm types lose payments, whereas 60% gain 
payments.
The right panel complements the left panel 
by presenting the distribution on a per-hectare 
basis. The area between the x-axis and the 
distribution function shows the total amount 
of redistributed payments. When the line is 
below zero, it represent a loss in payments, and 
Figure 4: Redistribution of decoupled payments across farm types and scenarios
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when it is above zero, it represents a gain in 
payments. 
Next, the distributional effects for the 
farm types that lose payments (oilseed, cereals 
and protein crops, general field cropping and 
mixed cropping and dairying) are discussed. 
The distribution for specialised olives, mixed 
crops and livestock and permanent crops 
mixed, which also lose, is provided in the 
Annex.
Figure 5 shows that almost 40% of farms 
specialised in cereals, oilseed and protein 
crops lose payments in the Nuts1 sub-scenario, 
whereas approximately 35% are not affected, 
and the remaining 15% gain payments. Overall 
(at the endpoint of the curve in Figure 5), these 
farms lose 403 million €. For the other two 
sub-scenarios (MS and EU flat rate), the net 
redistribution loss is higher (i.e., the endpoints 
are lower), more farms are affected by the 
redistribution of SPS payments (i.e., the linear 
part of the curve is smaller, and for the EU 
flat-rate scenario, it almost disappears), and 
more money is redistributed (the curves are 
deeper) compared to the Nuts1 sub-scenario. In 
particular, the EU flat-rate sub-scenario reveals 
that almost 60% of the farms specialising in 
cereals, oilseed and protein crops lose payments, 
whereas 40% gain payments. 
Figure 5:  Redistribution of decoupled payments for the specialised cereals, oilseed and protein 
crops farm type
Figure 6:  Redistribution of decoupled payments for the general field cropping and mixed cropping 
farm type
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In Figure 6, the farm type specialised in 
general field cropping and mixed cropping is 
shown. For the first two scenarios, the curves have 
a similar shape as those for the cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops farm type. The percentages of 
farms that lose and gain, respectively, are similar, 
whereas the curve for the EU flat-rate scenario 
reveals that 30%, compared to 60% for the 
general field cropping and mixed cropping farm 
type, lose payments. This result is more evident 
from the right panel in Figure 6, where some 
farms experience a huge per-hectare value of the 
payment losses.
In Figure 7, dairy farms are presented. As 
reported in Table 10, they lose on aggregate in all 
three scenarios (Nuts1: 10%; MS: 12%; and EU: 
23%). Only olives and permanent crops mixed 
lose more decoupled payments in percentage 
terms (Table 9). 
We now consider the farm types that benefit 
from the flat rate. In Figure 8 and Figure 9, the 
farms specialised in sheep, goats and other grazing 
livestock, and residual farm type, respectively, 
are presented. Note that the residual farm type 
includes those farms that are not considered 
among the nine most important farming types in a 
Nuts2 region. The figures reveal that even though, 
on aggregate, both of these farm types gain from 
the flat-rate schemes, a sizable number of farms 
experience a reduction in payments (up to 20%). 
Figure 7:  Redistribution of decoupled payments for specialised dairy farm types
Figure 8:  Redistribution of decoupled payments for sheep, goats and other grazing livestock farm 
types
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Redistribution of decoupled payments between 
regions
We now address the differences in the 
redistribution effects between regions. Here, 
the advantage is that we can use maps for 
visualisation. We start with Table 12, which reports 
the redistribution effects between the MSs in the 
EU-27. The first column shows the total value of 
decoupled payments at baseline, followed by 
the total value of payments obtained in the three 
considered sub-scenarios. The absolute and the 
percentage change compared to the baseline are 
presented in the remaining columns. 
By definition, the redistribution effects 
between the MS for the Nuts1 and MS flat-rate 
sub-scenarios are relatively small in the EU-10, as 
mentioned above; however, some changes occur 
in Slovenia and Malta due to their historical 
SPS. The endogenous land-use adjustment is 
responsible for the effects in the EU-15 MS. 
The EU flat-rate scenario has a considerable 
impact on the redistribution of payments between 
the MS. In relative terms, the Netherlands (48%), 
Belgium (45%) and Greece (44%) have the 
highest loss rates, whereas the largest increases 
are observed for Latvia (149%), Romania (92%), 
Estonia (82%), Bulgaria (55%) and Lithuania 
(54%). Payments also increase in Portugal (43%) 
and Spain (35%). 
Germany loses, in absolute terms, 1.35 
billion €, which represents 38% of the budget 
at baseline. France contributes 0.981 billion 
€ to the EU redistribution amount, followed by 
Italy (0.960 billion €) and Greece (0.956 billion 
€). Spain (1.760 billion €) and Portugal (0.260 
billion €) gain from the redistribution of payments 
in the EU flat-rate sub-scenario. The aggregated 
MS effects can differ from the Nuts2-level effects.
Table 13 provides percentage changes in 
payments for Nuts2 regions by splitting them into 
two groups: those with reduced payments and 
those with increased payments. For the Nuts1 and 
MS flat-rate scenarios, there are Nuts2 regions 
with both increased and reduced payments that 
almost compensate each other. In the EU flat-rate 
scenario, most of the Nuts2 regions lose in the 
EU-15 (with the exceptions of Spain, Portugal, 
Sweden, UK and Austria), whereas the vast 
majority of the Nuts2 regions win in the EU-10 
and BuR.
Figure 10 shows the results for the Nuts1, 
MS and EU flat-rate sub-scenarios at the Nuts2 
level. The figure demonstrates the change in per-
hectare value of decoupled payments relative 
to the baseline. In the Nuts1 and MS flat-rate 
scenarios, the deviation relative to the baseline is 
very small in the NMS (yellow regions) due to the 
SPAS implementation at the baseline, whereas for 
the EU flat-rate scenario, the changes (particularly 
Figure 9: Redistribution of decoupled payments for residual farm types
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in Romania and Latvia and Eastland) are greater 
than 200 € per ha UAA. The redistribution 
within the EU-15 for the MS flat-rate scenario is 
considerable, with the exception of Germany.
For many MS in the EU-15, a similar pattern in 
the flow of payments from more intensive to more 
extensive regions can be observed. France loses 
payments in northern regions, whereas the southern 
regions gain payments. UK loses payments, whereas 
Scotland gains. Similar redistribution effects can be 
observed in Italy, Spain and Sweden.
To summarise the effects, Table 14 presents 
the net redistributed amounts at different regional 
levels. The amount of redistributed payments 
increases from the Nuts1 scenario to the EU flat-
rate scenario, and it decreases from the farm 
level to the MS level. The payments reallocated 
between farms increase from 9% (3.7 billion €) of 
the total budget in the Nuts1 scenario to 19% (8.2 
billion €) in the EU flat-rate scenario. Similarly, 
payments reallocated between MS increase from 
1% (0.3 billion €) in the Nuts1 scenario to 13% 
(5.5 billion €) in the EU flat-rate scenario. The 
Table 12: Redistribution of decoupled payments at the MS level
EU-Aggregates and MS  
Baseline Nuts1 MS EU Nuts1 MS EU
EU-Aggregate Million € change to Baseline % to Baseline
EU-15
 Belgium 590 -15 -12 -266,0 -2,5 -2,1 -45,1
 Denmark 955 -34 -34 -364,4 -3,6 -3,6 -38,2
 Germany 5.234 -0 96 -1.356,9 1,8 -25,9
 Austria 691 -1 -0 68,1 -0,1 9,8
 Netherlands 822 -2 4 -397,6 -0,3 0,5 -48,3
 France 7.688 110 78 -983,7 1,4 1,0 -12,8
 Portugal 601 -19 -18 256,6 -3,1 -3,1 42,7
 Spain 4.977 -81 -91 1.759,9 -1,6 -1,8 35,4
 Greece 2.176 -92 -78 -956,7 -4,2 -3,6 -44,0
 Italy 4.213 -133 -141 -963,7 -3,1 -3,3 -22,9
 Ireland 1.242 -12 13 -269,1 -0,9 1,1 -21,7
 Finland 541 -10 -8 4,6 -1,8 -1,5 0,8
 Sweden 698 -34 -34 38,6 -4,9 -4,9 5,5
 United Kingdom 3.526 3 -16 65,0 0,1 -0,5 1,8
EU-10
 Czech Republic 891 -90,8 -10,2
 Estonia 101 82,7 81,7
 Hungary 1.319 -26,6 -2,0
 Lithuania 380 204,5 53,8
 Latvia 146 217,7 148,6
 Poland 3.045 584,6 19,2
 Slovenia 140 -1 -1 -24,4 -0,9 -0,9 -17,5
 Slovak Republic 388 64,7 16,7
 Cyprus 53 -18,4 -34,4
 Malta 2 0,1 -5,8 -5,8 2,5
Bulgaria 755 0 0 415,1 0,0 0,0 55,0
Romania 1.660 0 0 1.526,4 0,0 0,0 91,9
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Baseline
Nuts2 region with reduced 
decoupled payments
Nuts2 region with increased 
decoupled payments
Scenario Nuts1 MS EU Nuts1 MS EU
Country Mio. € % change of decoupled payments relative to baseline
Austria 691 12 19 12 12 19 22
Belgium 590 5 8 45 2 6
Germany 5.234 5 26 6
Denmark 955 4 4 38
Greece 2.176 18 18 46 13 14 2
Spain 4.977 7 16 9 5 14 44
Finland 541 3 3 2 1 2 2
France 7.688 4 12 19 6 13 6
Ireland 1.242 1 5 22 6
Italy 4.213 7 17 28 4 14 5
Netherlands 822 5 7 48 5 8
Portugal 601 15 16 1 12 13 43
Sweden 698 11 11 4 6 6 10
United Kingdom 3.526 17 15 16 17
Czech Republic 891 10
Cyprus 54 34
Estonia 101 82
Hungary 1.319 2
Lithuania 380 54
Latvia 146 149
Malta 2 6 6 3
Poland 3.045 2
Slovak Republic 388 17
Slovenia 140 1 1 17
Bulgaria 755 55
Romania 1.660 92
Figure 10: Regional redistribution of decoupled payments in €/ha UAA
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differences in the sizes of redistributed payments 
between Nuts2 regions lay between the farm and 
the MS levels. 
Impacts on land use and herd sizes 
The introduction of a uniform flat-rate system 
leads to adjustments in the value of payments at the 
regional and farm type levels. The redistribution 
of payments has an allocative response in CAPRI 
through land market adjustments in regions that 
experience a changed premium and in regions 
where premiums are differentiated for arable 
versus grasslands. In Table 15, the land use 
changes for grass, arable and total agricultural 
land are presented. 
In the EU-15, the UAA decreases between 
-1.1% and -1.7%, depending on the sub-
scenario considered. We observe almost no 
change in the UAA for the EU-10 and BuR. The 
entitlement endowment limits the amount of 
land that benefits from the flat-rate premium, so 
no land use expansion occurs. This is based on 
the assumption that in the calibration (baseline), 
all available premium rights are claimed. That 
is consistent with Article 42 of COUNCIL 
REGULATION (EC) No 73/2009 which states that 
unused premium rights are withdrawn. In the 
EU flat-rate scenario, a substitution effect occurs 
between grass and arable land. For fallow land 
(arable land category), the flat rate increased by 
almost 100% because it received a reduced flat-
rate premium at baseline. This increase results 
in a 1.4% increase in arable land in the EU-10. 
However, it does not affect the UAA because 
entitlements constrain the land expansion.
Farm types that could benefit from the re-
allocation of premiums rarely decrease their land 
use, whereas those that lose decrease their land 
use, driven by the land supply function.
The UAA, in combination with changes in 
herds and prices, induces changes in the crop 
rotation. This result is presented for the different 
farm type aggregates in Table 17 and Table 18. 
In general, land use for the main crops, 
except fallow land, is rarely affected. This result is 
not surprising because the decoupled payments 
should have no significant impact on the 
production decisions of farmers.
Note that some of the percentage differences 
shown  in Table 17 and Table 18 are large. 
This result is mainly caused by the fact that the 
percentage change is calculated relative to a 
small amount of land at baseline. Table 19 depicts 
the absolute deviation of herd sizes compared to 
the baseline. Here, we also observe rather small 
changes in herd sizes relative to baseline levels.
Impact on the agricultural market
The full integration of the farm types in the 
CAPRI model system allows the farm behaviour 
model to interact with the market model. This 
interaction between the farm type layer and the 
market model allows the supply obtained from 
the EU-25 farm types and the regional supplies 
from BuR to balance the market demand.
Because the production response of the 
farmers is limited to adjustments in land use, 
Table 14: Summary of redistribution effects at the farm type, Nuts2 and MS levels 
Re-distribution of SPS 
between 
unit
flat-rate Scenario
No.
Nuts1 MS EU
Farm types
% 9% 12% 19%
1.837
∆ mio. €  3.673 5.249 8.175
Nuts2
% 4% 10% 17%
276
∆ mio. € 1.564 4.076 7.344
Member States
% 1% 1% 13%
27
∆ mio. € 274 313 5.503
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which results in small production changes, price 
changes are also moderate, as shown in Table 20. 
The redistributions of decoupled payments in the 
Nuts1 and MS flat-rate scenarios (which mainly 
affect the EU-15) lead to only small price effects. 
As expected, the EU flat-rate scenario is the 
most responsive to price, with a maximum price 
increase for cereals of 1.5% for the EU-15 and 
2.9% for the EU-10 (Figure 11).  
The market balances for domestic 
production and domestic demand are shown in 
Table 21. The domestic demand is composed 
of human consumption, processing (including 
biofuel processing) and feed use. The difference 
between production and demand is the net trade 
(i.e., exports minus imports). Note that only 
commodities with changes over 1% observed at 
least in one sub-scenario are presented. Overall, 
consumption and production effects are small, 
with changes varying between 0% and 4% 
relative to the baseline level.  
Impact on income
The income indicator in the CAPRI 
represents gross value added plus premiums 
(prices times production minus variable 
costs plus premiums). Given that the price 
and production changes are small (Table 20), 
the income effects are driven mainly by the 
redistributed decoupled payments and to a 
lesser extent by land use changes. We start to 
analyse the income changes at the aggregated 
level. According to Table 22, negligible changes 
are observed for the Nuts1 and MS flat-rate 
scenarios.
For the EU flat-rate scenario, income 
decreases by 2.5% in the EU-15, whereas the 
EU-10 (7%), Bulgaria (18%) and Romania (16%) 
Figure 11:  Cereal supply change in % relative to the baseline
 Nuts1 flat rate           MS flat rate                             EU flat rate
Table 22: Income changes for different EU aggregates
EU-Aggregates and MS  
baseline Nuts1 MS EU Nuts1 MS EU
Million € change from baseline % of baseline
EU-15 178.675 -400 -196 -4.553 -0,2 -0,1 -2,5
EU-10 17.174 -3 2 1.231 -0,0 0,0 7,2
Bulgaria 2.274 -2 -1 419 -0,1 -0,0 18,4
Romania 9.379 -14 -12 1.529 -0,1 -0,1 16,3
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baseline Nuts1 MS EU Nuts1 MS EU
Million € change from baseline % of baseline
Belgium 3.409 -25 -23 -292 -0,7 -0,7 -8,6
Denmark 3.360 -37 -34 -409 -1,1 -1,0 -12,2
Germany 21.740 -57 61 -1.744 -0,3 0,3 -8,0
Austria 3.784 -8 -4 61 -0,2 -0,1 1,6
Netherlands 11.138 2 10 -429 0,1 -3,8
France 33.985 93 85 -1.401 0,3 0,3 -4,1
Portugal 3.456 -33 -32 276 -0,9 -0,9 8,0
Spain 35.101 -98 -106 1.728 -0,3 -0,3 4,9
Greece 10.266 -28 3 -903 -0,3 -8,8
Italy 34.078 -139 -116 -993 -0,4 -0,3 -2,9
Ireland 4.355 -16 11 -308 -0,4 0,3 -7,1
Finland 1.794 -13 -10 -18 -0,7 -0,6 -1,0
Sweden 1.772 -23 -22 -0 -1,3 -1,2
United Kingdom 10.442 -20 -19 -122 -0,2 -0,2 -1,2
Czech Republic 1.836 -64 -3,5
Estonia 400 89 22,2
Hungary 2.966 1 2 19 0,1 0,6
Lithuania 957 215 22,5
Latvia 288 223 77,6
Poland 8.979 -1 2 706 7,9
Slovenia 726 -2 -2 -21 -0,3 -0,3 -2,9
Slovak Republic 822 1 80 0,1 9,8
Cyprus 169 -16 -9,6
Figure 12:  Income changes in €/ha UAA
 Nuts1 flat rate           MS flat rate                             EU flat rate
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realise income increases. Compared to Table 9, 
this result is approximately equal to the amount 
of redistributed payments for the EU-10 and 
BuR. The income loss in the EU-15 is higher 
than the premium loss as a result of the 1.7% 
land use reduction (see also Table 15).
Table 23 shows the income changes at the MS 
level. For the Nuts1 and MS flat-rate scenarios, all 
income changes are small (up to -1.3%). For the 
EU flat-rate scenario, the greatest income losses 
in absolute terms occur in Germany, France, 
Greece and Italy.
Similar to the effects shown for the 
redistribution of payments, Austria, Portugal and 
Spain realise income increases in the EU flat-rate 
scenario. For the EU-10, income increases in all 
MS, with the exceptions of the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Cyprus.
Figure 12 reports the income change per 
hectare relative to baseline at the Nuts2 level. 
The income changes are calculated based on the 
aggregated value of income over all farm types in 
a particular Nuts2 region. 
The income changes across Nuts2 regions 
for the Nuts1 flat-rate scenario are small. There 
are five Nuts2 regions that realise income 
decreases below -34 € per ha. The EU-10 and 
BuR are not affected in this scenario. Germany 
is not affected as it already implements the Nuts1 
regional flat-rate system at baseline. The effect of 
income redistribution is driven by the payment 
redistribution: the income moves from intensive 
regions with higher premium levels to marginal 
regions. For the EU flat rate in particular, Southern 
and Eastern Europe realise income growth. 
The distributional issues within the farm types 
are analysed in Figure 13, Figure 14 and Figure 15, 
where cumulative income changes over all farm 
types are reported for the Nuts1, MS and EU flat-
rate scenarios, respectively. On the x-axis, all farms 
belonging to the analysed group are normalised to 
100% (1=100%). The figures report cumulative 
income changes (in ascending order) for all farm 
Figure 13:  Income changes in the Nuts1 flat-rate scenario
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types (light-blue dotted curve) and for each type of 
farming (all other curves). Note that the unit of the 
x-axis corresponds directly to the light-blue curve, 
whereas the rest of curves (representing single 
types of farming) also add up to 100%. The order 
of the curves representing the types of farming has 
no special meaning; it was chosen such that the 
curves would not overlap. Results are weighted 
based on the number of farms involved in each 
type of farming. The y-axis is scaled identically 
for all farms and for all types of farming to better 
illustrate the total income effects. 
Farm groups located on the negatively sloped 
part of the curve realise income losses, whereas 
farm groups located on the positive slope realise 
income gains. A flat curve indicates no income 
change. Note that the endpoint of each curve 
represents the total income change as reported in 
Table 24. For all 1824 farms (the light-blue dotted 
curve), the values for income change are shown in 
rectangles in Figure 13, Figure 14 and Figure 15. 
First, taking into consideration the 
distributional issues for the Nuts1 scenario, 32% 
of the farm types lose income, whereas 35% are 
not affected and the rest realise income growth 
(light-blue curve). The total aggregated income 
of all farm types (the endpoint of the light-blue 
curve) drops slightly (0.21%), representing 0.4 
billion € (Figure 13).
As shown in Figure 13, the income changes 
for the different specialised farm groups 
are substantial, mainly due to the premium 
redistribution and land abandonment, whereas 
price changes have only a moderate impact.
The distribution curves for the Nuts1 scenario 
for the eleven farm types show that particularly 
extensive production systems, such as sheep 
and goats and residual farms, experience an 
increase in income. In contrast, field cropping 
farm groups (cereals, oilseed and protein crops, 
general field cropping and mixed cropping), 
dairy farms, mixed crop livestock and olive farms 
obtain lower incomes. Vineyards do not receive 
direct payments at baseline but benefit from the 
flat-rate payments, in contrast to olive farms, 
which experience a lower income caused by the 
Figure 14:  Income changes in the MS flat-rate scenario
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Table 24 Aggregated income changes in the EU-25 by farm type
EU-25 
Baseline Nuts1 MS EU Nuts1 MS EU
Type of Farming Million € change from baseline % of baseline
 Cereals, oilseed & protein crops 15.435 -358 -524 -497,9 -2,3 -3,4 -3,2
 General field & mixed cropping 19.300 -435 -572 -1.007,5 -2,3 -3,0 -5,2
 Dairying 30.233 -471 -573 -1.236,2 -1,6 -1,9 -4,1
 Cattle- Dairying -rearing & fattening 8.522 114 339 -373,3 1,3 4,0 -4,4
 Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 10.515 563 1.173 863,4 5,4 11,2 8,2
 Granivores 8.026 1 5 32,9 0,1 0,4
 Mixed livestock holdings 4.735 -36 -39 34,4 -0,8 -0,8 0,7
 Mixed crops-livestock 16.917 -305 -354 -813,2 -1,8 -2,1 -4,8
 Vineyards 5.653 128 206 104,8 2,3 3,6 1,9
 Fruit and citrus fruit 4.059 9 -20 17,7 0,2 -0,5 0,4
 Olives 6.585 -603 -839 -904,1 -9,2 -12,7 -13,7
 Permanent crops mixed 1.434 -48 -52 -89,0 -3,4 -3,6 -6,2
 Horticulture 1.204 2 -2 -2,7 0,2 -0,1 -0,2
Economic Size Class
 <=16 ESU 30.699 -90 175 244,2 -0,3 0,6 0,8
 >16 and <=100 ESU 57.952 -805 -527 -2.203,5 -1,4 -0,9 -3,8
 >100 ESU 43.966 -544 -898 -1.911,5 -1,2 -2,0 -4,3
Residual 60.357 1.097 1.146 797,9 1,8 1,9 1,3
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of the Nuts1 flat rate.
As shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, the 
MS and the EU flat-rate scenarios lead to similar 
directions of causation as the Nuts1 flat rate, but 
with more income change. Overall, more farms 
experience income gain or income loss and fewer 
farms remain unaffected in the MS flat-rate and 
EU flat-rate scenarios. These scenarios result in 
aggregated income losses of 0.2 and 3.3 billion 
€, respectively, at the EU-25 level. In the EU flat-
rate scenario, a major part of this income loss is 
realised as income gains in BuR.
Conclusion
The CAPRI farm type model permits to 
analyse SPS implementation options with respect 
to the redistribution effects and market effects 
on various farm types in Europe. The farm type 
supply models adjust the production pattern 
and land use endogenously, steered by the land 
supply functions and by feedback from the market 
module. The implementation of a flat-rate scheme 
changes the levels of decoupled payments among 
farms and regions, causing important income 
effects. Further, this change results in land use 
changes and leads to adjustments in production, 
supply and prices. However, the binding 
entitlement endowments limit the overall market 
effects of a flat-rate scheme.
The analysis in this chapter has shown that 
the allocative market responses are relatively 
minor. These results clearly reflect the fact that 
the vast majority of agricultural land in the 
new MS was already operating under a uniform 
premium scheme at the country level and that 
some MS in the EU-15 already applied flat-rate 
schemes at the regional level. The allocative 
response in CAPRI is mostly limited to changes 
in land use for those regions losing premiums 
and slight substitution effects where premiums 
were differentiated between arable land and 
grasslands. Regions where the premiums 
increase are bounded by the entitlement 
constraint, so the payment changes are not 
reflected in market effects. 
Given that historical and regional SPS 
premiums are strictly linked to coupled payments 
and other types of support related to Pillar I and 
paid under the Agenda 2000, the historical SPS 
better reflects the productivity and specialisations 
of the regions. Regions with high historical 
yields for cereals and larger ruminant stocking 
densities also show higher historical SPS rates. 
A uniform flat rate tends to reduce the support 
level in more productive regions and increase it 
in more marginal regions. The scenario analyses 
have shown that there are strong heterogeneous 
impacts of the introduction of the flat rate on the 
various farm types. Particularly strongly affected 
are large farms and farms classified as dairying, 
mixed crops and livestock, general field and 
mixed cropping, olives, cereals and oilseeds, and 
permanent crops. Small farms in both the old and 
the new MS tended to be affected little by the 
introduction of the flat rate.
One might conclude that as long as the 
majority of Pillar I is paid as a flat rate per 
hectare (independent of the amount) and the 
GAEC (Good Agricultural and Environmental 
Conditions) are respected, the definition of the 
scheme impacts mostly distributional issues 
within the EU agricultural sector. On the other 
hand, the impact of a flat rate on commodity 
markets is very moderate; therefore, consumers’ 
welfare and trade in agricultural products are 
affected little.
III. 2. WTO Scenario
The focus of this scenario is the unique link 
between a spatial global market model and the 
farm type supply models. The CAPRI market 
module can be characterised as a comparative-
static, deterministic, partial, spatial, global 
equilibrium model for most primary and some 
secondary agricultural products, fifty commodities 
in total. It is deterministic as stochastic effects are 
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not covered and partial as it excludes primary 
factors, non-agricultural products as well as some 
agricultural products, such as flowers. It is spatial 
because it includes bilateral trade flows and the 
related trade policy instruments between the 
trade blocks. The trade blocks are presented in 
Figure 16. 
Each pair of regions can trade bilaterally, 
simultaneously exporting and importing the same 
commodity. This behaviour is based on the so-
called Armington assumption (Armginton 1969): 
products of differen geographical origins are 
treated as imperfect substitutes on the demand 
side. The shares of products of different origins in 
the consumption bundle are determined by their 
price relations.
All countries have agreed, in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) context, not to 
increase the rate of duty beyond a certain 
tariff level (bound tariff), also called most 
favoured nations (MFN) tariffs. MFN tariffs are 
differentiated by tariff line (i.e. product), but 
not importer (i.e., countries exporting into the 
importing country). The tariffs applied are those 
that are actually applied by the country group. 
They may take the bound rate, but frequently 
they do not. There are exceptions to the rule 
that all importers face the same import MFN 
tariff. The first, EU specific exemption, is quota 
and tariff free access of LDSc to EU markets. 
Similarly, the EC-ACP partnership program for 
ACP countries, currently 79 countries from 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific area, 
most of which are former colonies of the EU 
Members; these countries face lower tariffs. The 
third exception is the free trade areas (bilateral 
agreements) with no tariffs. The EU-27 is a 
trading block aggregate and itself an example 
of a free trade area. The last exception is the 
application of tariff rate quotas (TRQs). A TRQ 
is a defined quota of an imported good that is 
available either bilaterally to a specific trading 
partner or globally to all trading partners, where 
a so-called lower “in quota tariff” is applied. 
For imports beyond the quota, MFN tariffs are 
applied. Another exception to the rule of equal 
tariffs is the instrument of variable import levies, 
which reduces tariffs if the import price (CIF 
plus tariffs) is higher than a specified minimum 
border price in the EU. A somewhat similar 
instrument is the entry price system used in the 
fruit and vegetable sectors in the EU. The entry 
price relates the applied tariff to a specified 
trigger price in a way that encourages imports 
at a price (CIF plus tariffs) that is between 92% 
and 98% of the trigger price.
Figure 16:  Trade blocks in the CAPRI global market model
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Liberalisation of international trade is 
the major topic of the current WTO round, 
and although the negotiations are far from 
reaching an agreement, this scenario aims at 
quantifying the impact of a proposal made by 
the chair of the WTO’s agriculture negotiations, 
Ambassador Crawford Falconer, in December 
2008 (WTO, 2008). He proposed a general 
tariff reduction based on a tiered formula, 
a reduction of TRQs in quota tariffs and the 
possibility to exclude certain products, called 
sensitive products, at the cost of the extension 
of TRQs for the sensitive products for imports.
The tariff reductions analysed in this section 
are based on tiered formulas with four bands, 
implying that tariffs that are high will be cut 
more aggressively than tariffs that are low and 
thus distort trade less (Table 25). For example, 
if the initial tariff, i.e., expressed relative to the 
value of imported goods is greater than 75%, the 
developed countries will be obliged to reduce 
it by 70%. The same initial tariff for developing 
countries will be reduced by 38% due to different 
thresholds for developed and developing 
countries. 
The developed countries are the EU-15, 
EU- 10, Norway, Bulgaria, Romania, the Western 
Balkans, the rest of Europe, Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand. All other countries are developing 
countries.
For TRQs in quota tariffs, the following 
reduction is proposed: a reduction by 50%, but 
at least to 10%, for developed countries, and all 
tariffs that are already below 5% should be set 
to zero. For developing countries, in quota tariffs 
are reduced by 15%, with no other rules. 
It should be noted that CAPRI differentiates 
between specific and ad-valorem tariffs. Specific 
tariffs represent fixed amounts of Euro/t that are 
charged on imports. Ad-valorem tariffs are charged 
as a percentage of the value of imports. The 
tariff cuts are applied to ad-valorem equivalents 
(AVEs). Ad-valorem tariff equivalents have to be 
calculated for specific tariffs. This calculation is 
done by dividing the specific tariffs by the average 
import price of tariffs of the respective product.
The proposal also allows each country to 
define certain products as sensitive. Pelikan et 
al. (2010) show, by comparing EU cumulated 
import values with the percentage of tariff lines 
used for the accumulation, that already 1% (5%) 
of the tariff lines (6 digits) in the EU can account 
for up to 27% (55%) of the total imported value. 
Although it is unlikely that the trade value will be 
chosen as a criterion to define the product list, 
this result shows how the definition of sensitive 
products can have serious impacts on the 
remaining protection level. If a product is defined 
as sensitive, a smaller tariff cut is used at the cost 
of an extension of the respective tariff rate quota. 
The proposal leaves the options to reduce the 
tariff cut in the formula by 33%, 50% or 66%, 
with corresponding tariff rate quota extensions of 
Table 25: Tariff reduction formula in the Falconer proposal
Reductions for...
... developed countries (in %) ... developing countries (in %)
Thresholds for tariffs 1) cut Thresholds for tariffs 1) cut
0 <= 20 50.00 0 <= 30 33.33
20 <= 50 57.00 30 <= 80 38.00
50 <= 75 64.00 80 <= 130 42,67
> 75 70.00 > 130 46.67
1)  Tariffs are translated to Ad Valorem Equivalents (AVEs) to determine which reduction percentage applies.
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3%, 3.5% or 4% of domestic consumption of that 
good in the importing country. 
Because, to the best of our knowledge, no 
information is yet available on the definition of 
sensitive products, we have chosen the lowest tariff 
decrease for sensitive products (66%) combined 
with the highest tariff rate quota extension of 4%. 
For developed countries, the extension is only 2/3 
of this 4%. We further assume that the additional 
tariff rate quotas are distributed among global and 
bilateral TRQs according to their initial shares in 
the base year. 
We define the following as sensitive products 
for developed countries: cheese, butter, beef, pork 
and poultry meat, sugar, tomatoes and apples. For 
developing countries, the sensitive products are 
defined as: beef, sugar, rice, wine and skim milk 
powder. The current scenario also assumes that 
all export subsidies are removed. 
Results
In Table 26, the WTO scenario and its 
percentage changes to the baseline for TRQs, MFN 
tariffs for each product group and all importers 
for the EU-27 are presented. The change for 
each product group is the result of the different 
tariff regimes for the countries that import into 
the EU-15/EU-10 and BuR. For example, the 
global TRQs for meat and dairy products and 
secondary products increase due to the expansion 
mechanics for TRQs. Also, TRQs for beef, pork 
and poultry meat increase up to four percent of 
domestic consumption, which includes human 
consumption, feed use and processing. This result 
leads to an increase of 340% for meat and 186% 
for dairy products (cheese and butter are sensitive 
products in this aggregate).
Among secondary products, sugar is 
responsible for a 50% increase to 324 thousand 
tonnes of global TRQs and 3051 thousand 
tonnes of bilateral TRQs. TRQs for apples and 
peaches exist at baseline for bilateral TRQs, 
which increased by 50%. Global TRQs for 
apples and tomatoes are newly introduced. The 
corresponding tariff reductions range between 
50% and 70% for products that are not defined 
as sensitive. For beef, sugar and dairy products, 
the drop is less pronounced.
The welfare measure shown  in Table 27 
is decomposed into consumer welfare (money 
metric), agricultural (primary factor) income, 
taxpayers’ costs and profits for processing. Welfare 
changes stem from changes in production, 
consumption and prices as well as changes in 
subsidies and tariff revenues. The absolute values 
and differences are shown in Table 26.
It becomes apparent that the implementation 
of the Falconer proposal leads to total welfare 
Table 26: Changes of TRQs and tariffs aggregated for all imports into the EU-27
Global Quota Bilateral Quotas Ad val. MFN Spec. MFN
WTO 
Scenario 
[1000t]
% to 
Baseline
WTO 
Scenario 
[1000t]
% to 
Baseline
WTO 
Scenario 
[%]
% to 
Baseline
WTO 
Scenario 
[Euro/t]
% to 
Baseline
Cereals 6181 663 2,6 -65 32 -66
Other arable field crops 0 -100 282 4,3 -50
Vegetables and Permanent crops 1309 +inf 1173 50 2,4 -60 92 -44
Meat 1944 340 444 56 6,8 -41 1362 -28
Other Animal products 135 -100 0,8 -70 208 -70
Dairy products 639 186 126 57 8,1 -27 1100 -30
Oils 6 57 0 2,4 -50 13 -44
Oil cakes 0 -100 -100 -100 0
Secondary products 324 50 3051 30 -100 214 -29
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gain (+3.1 billion €). The computations indicate 
that trade liberalisation constitutes a welfare 
gain for the consumer of 8.5 billion €. Consumer 
welfare is a metric measure calculated as the 
income required to obtain the utility of the 
simulation consumption bundle at the prices 
of the baseline scenario. Tariff reduction with 
lower prices causes a consumer gain in the EU, 
a producer loss, and lower tariff revenues due 
to efficiency increases when more goods are 
produced where the cost of doing so is lowest. 
Table 27: EU-27 welfare position changes in million €
Baseline WTO
Million € abs change to BAS
Total Welfare a+b+c+d-e 7.755.742 7.758.851 3.109
 Consumer Welfare a 7.623.298 7.631.811 8.513
 Agricultural Income b 207.502 200.692 -6.810
 Profit of Dairies      c 31.661 31.661 0
 Tariff Revenues      d 4.223 3.611 -612
 Tax Payers Cost e 110.941 108.924 -2.017
Agricultural income a g-k+f 207.502 200.682 -6.820
 Premiums f 53.733 53.659 -74
  Gross value added g-k 153.769 147.024 -6.745
   EAA Output g h+i 407.887 394.823 -13.064
   EAA Input k l+m 254.118 247.799 -6.319
    EAA Crops h-1 148.297 146.730 -1.567
     Output Crops h 217.767 215.826 -1.941
     Input Crop l 69.470 69.097 -373
    EAA Animal i-m 83.515 78.052 -5.463
     Output Animals i 190.120 178.996 -11.124
     Input Animal specific m 106.605 100.944 -5.661
    Input others n 78.043 77.758 -285
Figure 17:  Changes of producer prices in the WTO scenario
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€. Tax revenue for the EU-27 decreases. The 
reduction of agricultural (primary factor) income 
comes mainly from animal production, with 5.4 
billion €, compared to 1.5 billion € from crop 
production. Agricultural income is calculated as 
output minus inputs plus premiums. Premiums 
decrease only slightly, by 74 million €, due to 
small land use change. These results can be 
understood in the light of the price changes shown 
in Figure 17, where products with price decreases 
of more than five percent are presented. 
Almost all agricultural product prices come 
under pressure when tariffs are reduced and 
the export competition is improved for non-EU 
trade partners. A distinctive price reduction can 
be observed for sugar of 14%, beef meat 13%, 
sheep and goat meat 11%, fruits 11%, butter 
10% and cream and rice 5%. As a result, the raw 
Table 29: Herd-size changes for different EU aggregates and MS in the WTO scenario
Cattle activities  Beef meat activities  Other animals
Baseline WTO Baseline WTO Baseline WTO
EU-Aggregate 1.000 heads % 1.000 heads % 1.000 heads % 
EU-15 73.041 -2,5 24.412 -4,1 336.893 -1,2
EU-10 6.820 -1,7 1.337 -5,7 43.727 -0,8
Bulgaria 968 -1,3 227 -4,3 1.833 -2,2
Romania 3.241 -0,6 842 -0,5 13.775 -0,7
EU-15
Belgium 2.482 -2,7 695 -5,2 12.872 0,0
Denmark 1.422 -0,7 327 2,2 26.310 -0,2
Germany 9.445 -1,0 1.645 -2,7 51.466 -0,4
Austria 1.812 -1,7 533 -3,6 5.242 -0,5
Netherlands 3.806 -1,7 62 -5,1 18.390 -0,7
France 17.605 -2,8 6.341 -4,6 42.954 -1,1
Portugal 1.494 -2,7 666 -3,3 8.256 -0,9
Spain 8.745 -3,5 4.496 -4,3 80.251 -1,3
Greece 756 -3,2 324 -4,5 17.472 -2,3
Italy 8.038 -2,6 2.598 -4,8 25.927 -0,5
Ireland 5.890 -2,6 2.599 -3,2 7.223 -2,3
Finland 793 -2,9 228 -3,5 2.228 -0,7
Sweden 1.155 -2,2 354 -3,2 3.327 -0,5
United Kingdom 9.597 -2,9 3.546 -4,1 34.975 -3,5
EU-10
Czech Republic 537 -3,0 115 -5,7 4.142 -1,0
Estonia 162 -0,2 22 -1,2 538 -0,8
Hungary 418 -1,7 53 -6,5 5.623 -0,9
Lithuania 629 4,3 59 -0,2 1.414 -0,7
Latvia 314 -1,7 64 -2,2 390 -1,4
Poland 4.049 -2,2 841 -5,9 28.040 -0,6
Slovenia 376 -3,8 122 -7,6 510 -0,9
Slovak Republic 241 -2,9 39 -9,4 1.356 -1,0
Cyprus 77 -2,8 20 -5,6 1.582 -1,2
Malta 17 -2,4 3 -8,4 133 -0,3
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milk price comes under pressure and decreases 
by 3%. Tariff reduction causes additional 
demand for imports into the EU. Total imports 
into the EU increase, particularly of meat (30%), 
dairy products (22%), cereals (7%) and pulses 
(10%). 
Increasing imports affects the domestic 
supply in the EU and, hence, land use and herd 
sizes. The effects on plant production for the EU 
are rather moderate, as depicted in Table 28. The 
increase of cereals from the EU-10 is noticeable 
and results from a price increase due to baseline 
prices compared to the EU-15. One could also 
expect that the fodder area should be significantly 
reduced given the price decreases for beef meat 
and some other milk products. This is not the 
case because the substitution from intensive to 
extensive grassland keeps the total land area for 
fodder almost unchanged. Because oilseed prices 
decrease only moderately and in combination 
with decreased competition for land from other 
crops, oilseed cropping hectares increase by 
1.3% in the EU-15. The increased production 
Table 30: Income change in € per head for all activities in the WTO scenario
EU-27 EU-15 EU- 10
Crop activity aggregated € per ha % to Basline € per ha % to Basline € per ha % to Basline 
 Cereals 290 -2 327 -4 264 4
 Oilseeds 424 -0 436 -1 488 1
 Vegetables and Permanent crops 6131 0 6549 0 2437 -4
 Fodder activities 226 0 216 0 251 -0
 Set aside and fallow land 149 1 177 0 102 -0
Animal activity aggregated € per head % to Basline € per head % to Basline € per head % to Basline 
 All cattle activities 466 -9 490 -8 505 -7
 Beef meat activities 129 -34 137 -32 195 -30
 Other animals 60 -3 59 -3 49 -3
Meat production activity sorted 
 Other Cows 54 -66 64 -57 -27 -56
 Male adult cattle low weight 56 -43 62 -40 125 -32
 Heifers fattening low weight 53 -31 66 -26 52 -39
 Heifers fattening high weight 209 -28 248 -25 153 -39
 Male adult cattle high weight 339 -23 367 -22 299 -24
 Heifers breeding 151 -20 165 -19 46 -22
 Sheep and Goat fattening 34 -13 38 -13 26 -13
 Raising male calves 173 -12 187 -12 126 -20
 Milk Ewes and Goat 52 -10 56 -9 42 -8
 Raising female Calves 147 -10 154 -10 157 -8
 Poultry fattening * 314 -9 282 -10 269 -9
 Dairy Cows low yield 1006 -8 1200 -7 668 -7
 Dairy Cows high yield 1760 -6 1946 -6 1187 -5
 Fattening female calves 162 -4 171 -4 44 15
 Other animals 60 -3 59 -3 49 -3
 Pig fattening 25 -2 25 -2 20 -4
 Pig Breeding 102 -1 112 -1 46 -5
 Fattening male calves 145 -1 156 -1 41 -1
 Laying hens * 3771 4 2908 7 5051 0
* Per 1.000 heads
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to the EU by 2% and a small increase in oilseed 
cultivation by 1%.
In Table 29, the effect on animal herd sizes 
induced by price reduction and increased imports 
is presented. Beef cattle activities are reduced by 
4% in the EU-15, 6% in the EU-10 and 4% in 
Bulgaria. Consequently, all other cattle activities 
(including dairy cattle and raising cattle) are also 
reduced. Also, sizeable reductions in some MS, 
such as the UK and Ireland, are observed for other 
animals, such as sheep and goats, due to the price 
reduction. However, the changes, compared 
to significant price decreases, are rather small, 
particular for beef meat. The main reason is that 
part of the loss is passed on to the dairy cows 
via the calves. The decreased demand for calves 
hence can be satisfied by a smaller number of 
suckler cows, so this activity decreases by 4.6% 
in the EU. Another, albeit less important, reason 
for the conservative reaction is the decreased 
demand for fodder, translating into lower feeding 
costs and less fodder production.
Income changes in € per hectare or head 
for the EU-27, EU-15 and EU-10 are presented 
in Table 30. The first five rows depict the 
income change per hectare for the crop activity 
aggregates. The effects are rather moderate, 
whereas the income for meat production 
activities decreased for beef meat production 
by -34% in the EU-27. The last block in Table 
30 divides the effect by presenting all meat 
production activities in descending order by 
percentage income change. The largest income 
loss per head can be observed for suckler cows, 
where an income reduction from 54 € to 24 € 
per head is calculated. A subsequent decline can 
be found for other meat production activities. 
Table 30 also exposes the income disparity 
between EU-15 and EU-10. Please note that the 
total income change depends strongly on the 
absolute level of income per head. For example, 
dairy cows lose in absolute terms almost 80 € 
per head, compared to approximately 19 € 
per suckler cow. The effects of income change 
aggregated over the production activities and all 
farm types in a Nuts2 region are shown in Map 
2 of Figure 18. 
Figure 18:  Density of beef meat activity and change of income by Nuts2 region (WTO)
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For comparison, Map 1 presents the density 
of beef meat production activities in the EU in 
heads per hectare UAA. As expected, regions with 
intensive beef meat production lose comparably 
more income. Overall, the income loss ranges 
between 14% and 1%. 
Income effects by farm type and economic 
size aggregated across the EU-25 are summarised 
in Table 31. Absolute income loses are the 
largest for the dairy farm type, at 1.8 billion €, 
followed by mixed crops livestock at 0.8 billion 
€ and cattle, dairying -rearing and fattening at 0.7 
billion €. Medium-sized farms are most affected, 
at 2.6 billion €, when considering farm size. In 
percentage terms, the farm type cattle dairying, 
rearing and fattening loses the most income, at 
8%, followed by dairy farming at 6%.
The distributional issues within the farm 
types are analysed in Figure 19 by specialisation, 
where absolute income changes are compared 
to the baseline for the WTO scenario. On the 
x-axis, all farm groups are normalised to 100%, 
and for each single type of farming (small curves), 
a curve is derived. These smaller curves are 
arranged in ascending order and accumulate the 
income change compared to the baseline. For all 
farm types, the negative slope dominates, which 
means that mainly income losses are realised. 
Of all farm types, 95% lose income, whereas 5% 
realise income growth (light-blue curve). The total 
aggregated income of all farm types (represented 
by the endpoint of the light-blue curve) drops off 
by approximately 3%, or 5.9 billion €, for the EU-
25. Note that the agricultural income loss in Table 
27 of -6.8 billion € is the income loss in BuR, 
not based on farm types. The income loss for the 
following farm types is noticeable: dairying, mixed 
crops and livestock and residual. Note that the 
total income effect is indicated by the endpoint of 
each curve and is identical to the total income loss 
for each farm type shown in Table 31. 
Figure 20 shows the income loss evaluated 
on a per-hectare basis. The average income loss 
Table 31: Aggregated income change in the EU-25 by farm type in the WTO scenario
EU-25 
Baseline WTO
Type of Farming Million € change to Baseline % to Baseline
 Cereals, oilseed & protein crops 15.435 15.115 -320,2 -2,1
 General field & mixed cropping 19.300 18.944 -356,7 -1,8
 Dairying 30.233 28.443 -1.790,5 -5,9
 Cattle- Dairying -rearing & fattening 8.522 7.856 -665,3 -7,8
 Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 10.515 9.979 -536,2 -5,1
 Granivores 8.026 7.836 -190,3 -2,4
 Mixed livestock holdings 4.735 4.502 -232,8 -4,9
 Mixed crops-livestock 16.917 16.133 -783,8 -4,6
 Vineyards 5.653 5.656 3,7 0,1
 Fruit and citrus fruit 4.059 4.139 80,4 2,0
 Olives 6.585 6.318 -266,2 -4,0
 Permanent crops mixed 1.434 1.408 -25,2 -1,8
 Horticulture 1.204 1.194 -10,3 -0,9
Economic Size Class
<=16 ESU 30.699 29.867 -832,6 -2,7
>16 and <=100 ESU 57.952 55.346 -2.605,3 -4,5
>100 ESU 43.966 42.310 -1.655,5 -3,8
Residual 60.357 59.544 -813,6 -1,3
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Figure 20:  Change of income in €/ha UAA for important EU-25 farm types (WTO)
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per hectare is provided in brackets in the legend. 
The income of 1.8 billion € for dairy farms is 
distributed as follows: 15% of dairy farms lose 
more than 150 € and 45% lose between 100 € 
and 150 € per UAA. Thus, there is an overall loss 
of 100 € for dairy farms per ha UAA in the WTO 
scenario compared to the 30 € loss per ha UAA 
when considering all farm types. 
Conclusion
This chapter analysed a possible WTO 
agreement proposed by the chair of the WTO’s 
agriculture negotiations, Ambassador Crawford 
Falconer. The focus of the analysis is related to 
the market and income effects of the proposal for 
EU farms. The simulation results show that tariff 
reduction increases consumer welfare in the EU 
by 8.5 billion €, whereas income decreases for 
the agricultural sector by 6.8 billion € (-3%), 
mainly driven by the negative income change 
in the animal sectors of 5.5 billion €. Reduced 
trade protection increases imports and decreases 
producer and market prices in the EU, particularly 
for sugar (-14%) and beef (-13%) but also for 
butter (-10%), cream (-5%) and other fruits 
(-5%). The simulation showed that these price 
reductions translate into relatively small changes 
in agricultural production, for example, for beef 
meat at -4% (highest production change). The 
same results were found for land use and herd 
size changes. 
Despite the moderate change in production, 
price reductions directly affected the amount of 
farm income available to pay for primary factors 
like land and labour. The analysis has shown 
sizable impacts on farm income for different 
farm types. Generally, farm types specialised in 
livestock production showed the largest income 
reductions. The largest negative income effects 
were observed for cattle, dairying, rearing and 
fattening, dairy, mixed crops and livestock and 
sheep and goat farm types.
An explanation for the rather moderate 
production change given the significant price 
reduction is that a substantial part of the current 
protection and support given to EU agriculture 
is capitalised in land values. There will be only 
minor redistributions between agricultural sectors 
as the price reductions will be absorbed by the 
decrease in land values. 
Also, agriculture is a sector with many 
linkages between production activities. The drop 
in beef prices caused only moderate production 
decreases because calves for beef production are 
derived from the dairy sector. Because the dairy 
production does not decrease to any significant 
extent (-1%), the dairy sector continue to deliver 
the same amount of calves to the beef sector. The 
inflow of calves from dairy farmers will dampen 
the total output response in beef production and 
reduce dairy farmers’ income due to the reduction 
in calf prices (-40%). 
Another factor limiting the production 
response is the farm type model itself. Although 
no direct comparison with simulations of the 
Table 32: Input categories dependent on crude oil price and transmission elasticities
CAPRI Inputs
transission 
elasticities
CAPRI Inputs
transission 
elasticities
code description code description
NITF Nitrogen fertiliser 0.5 BGAS Heating gas and oil 0.6
PHOF Phospate in fertiliser [P2O5] 0.2 EFUL Fuels 0.6
POTF Potassium in fertiliser [K2O] 0.2 ELUB Lubricants 0.2
PLAP Plant protection 0.3 INPO Others 0.1
REPM Maintenance 0.1 SERI Services 0.1
REPB Maintenance buildings 0.1 IPHA Pharmaceutical 0.1
Source: Own calculations
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WTO scenario at an aggregated regional level 
was done, in general, the farm type supply model 
is less reactive to price changes because of its 
high specialisation in land endowment/animal 
density and crop rotation of the farm types. For 
example, a sheep farmer with only grassland can 
rarely switch to cash crop production. Hence, 
production adjusts less and price changes are 
larger.  
Compared to other similar studies (e.g., 
Junker et al. 2005, Jansson, 2006) with no 
sensitive products considered, the total welfare 
gain of 3.1 billion € in our study is low.
III.3 Macroeconomic Environment 
Scenario
Description
The macroeconomic environment is an 
important determining factor in the agricultural 
sector’s development. The food crisis in 
2007/2008 demonstrated that agricultural prices 
are responsive to macro pressures such as crude-
oil price changes and economic growth. In this 
scenario, we simulate the farm-level effects of 
a hypothetical economic recovery scenario that 
may lead to higher GDP growth and higher oil 
prices.
The crude oil price in the CAPRI baseline 
is taken from the AGLINK baseline. It is equal 
to 38 US dollars/barrel in 2005, increasing 
to 104 US dollars/barrel in 2020. In the 
macroeconomic environment (ME) scenario, 
we simulate an increase in the crude oil price 
by 50% relative to the baseline. This increase 
is translated into increased production costs 
for farmers via transmission elasticities. The 
implicit oil price elasticities differ among the 
input cost categories available in the supply 
model, as shown in Table 328. 
In addition to the impact of the price of oil 
on the supply side, we also need to consider 
its impact on the market side. CAPRI assumes 
a positive relationship between transport 
costs and crude oil prices. Transport costs are 
assumed to have a fixed margin and to depend 
on the locations of the trading partners.9 An 
increase of the oil price is assumed to shift the 
fixed margins upward to an extent determined 
by the transmission elasticities for fuels (EFUL). 
In addition, for all regions with behavioural 
functions, a shift in agricultural production costs 
8 We planned to derive these elasticities from the AGLINK 
model, but the goal of attaining compatibility between 
AGLINK and CAPRI inputs was outside the scope of this 
project. AGLINK distinguishes the price indices specific for 
a crop and an animal aggregate for a few countries and 
with respect to some crops for other countries. An analysis 
was performed where AGLINK was shocked with oil price 
changes, and the effect of those shocks on the cost of 
production index (CPCI) by which most prices in AGLINK 
are normalised was investigated. The resulting elasticities 
for most countries were so small that no effect at all would 
have appeared in the scenario. The only usable elasticity 
from this exercise was that of the world fertiliser price, 
which was calculated to be 0.47 and is thus very consistent 
with our assumption. Lacking any other information on the 
required elasticities, we finally used the values presented in 
Table 32, which were already used in the CAPRI system and 
were selected based only on plausibility considerations. 
9 This requirement means that, e.g., if transport costs 
between country A and country B are increased, the import 
prices for agricultural goods in country B that are imported 
from A become higher, so imports will be less attractive for 
consumers in B.
Table 33: Overview of the macroeconomic environment scenario
Scenario Description Assumptions
1. ME-full Combination of ME-oil and ME-GDP 
2. ME-oil Oil price increase of 50%
Translation into production and transport costs via 
elasticities 
3. ME-GDP
Global additional GDP increase by 1% per 
annum = ca. 16% higher GDP compared to 
the baseline
Consumer expenditures increase by the same 
percentage. 
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using a price index of all non-agricultural goods is 
introduced. The same price index is used to take 
into account the impact of oil prices on consumer 
non-agricultural/food prices. This consumer price 
effect is derived from AGLINK price simulation 
scenarios and is afterwards translated into CAPRI. 
The ME scenario also includes assumptions 
regarding changes in GDP. The yearly growth 
rate of the world GDP is assumed to be one 
percentage point higher than the rate assumed 
at baseline.10 To better identify the impact of the 
10 This value was provided by the IPTS.
macroeconomy on farms, we decompose the 
ME scenario (ME-full), which comprises both oil 
price and GDP effects, into two sub-scenarios: 
the first sub-scenario considers only the crude oil 
price effect (ME-oil), and the second considers 
only the GDP effect (ME-GDP) (Table 33).
Results
To analyse the scenario, we start with an 
overview of the impacts on agricultural markets 
and prices. Increasing oil prices and higher GDP 
growth are likely to increase market prices. A 
higher oil price drives input costs up, shifting the 
implicit supply curves to the left. Increased GDP 
Table 34: Price effects for different EU aggregates
Baseline ME-full ME-oil ME-GDP
 Euro / t %  to Baseline %  to Baseline %  to Baseline
Cereals 
EU-15 113 22 2,6 20
EU-10 93 26 1,9 25
BuR 128 21 2,9 18
Oilseeds 
EU-15 253 18 2,9 15
EU-10 261 19 3,2 16
BuR 243 23 4,9 18
Other arable field crops 
EU-15 180 9 1,1 8
EU-10 101 11 1,3 10
BuR 107 12 1,2 10
Vegetables & Permanent crops 
EU-15 1175 7 0,6 7
EU-10 434 16 0,2 16
BuR 472 13 0,2 13
Meat 
EU-15 2078 30 1,4 29
EU-10 1073 28 1 28
BuR 1485 23 1 22
Other Animal products 
EU-15 663 20 0,1 22
EU-10 734 11 0,1 12
BuR 1091 13 0,1 13
Dairy products 
EU-15 1345 12 0,2 11
EU-10 764 13 0,3 12
BuR 936 10 0,3 10
Oils
EU-15 1441 28 1,4 26
EU-10 646 22 2,2 20
BuR 541 30 2,3 27
Oil cakes 
EU-15 250 31 5,4 26
EU-10 139 25 7,3 19
BuR 117 37 6,6 31
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demand side. It enhances demand for agricultural 
commodities by shifting the demand curves to 
the right. The price effects of the ME scenario 
are shown in Table 34 for the EU aggregates. For 
all product aggregates, prices increase in each 
scenario. The price increases in the ME-full sub-
scenario are larger than the sum of the effects in 
the other two sub-scenarios. The most interesting 
finding is that the price effect of GDP growth is 
much larger than that of the oil price increase. 
An annual GDP growth rate that is increased 
by 1% increases the total value of GDP by 16% 
in 2020 relative to the baseline level. Such 
an increase in consumption expenditures is 
equivalent to a strong demand increase leading 
to price increases of between 5% and 30%. 
However, a 50% increase in the crude oil price is 
only partially translated into input costs, which, in 
turn, are only partially transferred to commodity 
prices, causing price increases of between 1% 
and 10%. Generally, it has been observed that 
increasing input costs in the past did not lead to 
considerable output price increases in agriculture. 
Comparing the situation in 2009 to the situation 
before the price peak in 2007, data reveal that 
agricultural prices returned to comparable levels 
observed in 2005, whereas the oil price and 
especially fertiliser costs were significantly higher 
in 2009 relative to 2005.
Table 34 also reveals differences in price 
effects between commodities and also between 
the three EU aggregates. The latter difference is 
due to their handling as different trading blocks 
in CAPRI. Each block has its own market price 
and thus reacts differently to shocks. Differences 
between commodities can be explained partly 
through different energy demands. Oilseeds, 
for example, are more energy intensive than 
cereals, and therefore the prices of the former 
increase more strongly in the ME-oil sub-
scenario. Furthermore, differences in the demand 
elasticities induce different price effects in the 
ME-GDP sub-scenario. 
The impact of the ME scenario on supply and 
demand of agricultural commodities is shown in 
Table 35. Following price effects, stronger supply-
demand effects are found for the ME-GDP sub-
scenario as compared to the ME-oil sub-scenario. 
The supply of the illustrated product aggregates 
increases between 3% and 20% in the ME-GDP 
sub-scenario and between -2% and 6% in the 
ME-oil sub-scenario.
For the demand side, we observe demand 
increases between 1% and 13% in the ME-GDP 
sub-scenario and between -2% and 1% in the 
ME-oil sub-scenario. Again, differences in supply 
and demand effects across commodities and 
country aggregates can be explained through 
differences in supply and demand elasticities as 
well as the initial quantities and energy demands 
of each activity. 
Increasing product prices generally change 
the production incentives for the different farm 
types. We observe two effects. First, because 
the price increases are not uniform across 
agricultural commodities, shifts occur in the 
relative competitiveness of commodities, leading 
to varying production effects across farm types. 
Second, the increase in agricultural prices 
stimulates the intensification and extension of 
production on arable land. At the EU-25 level in 
the ME-full sub-scenario, arable land expands by 
5.5 million ha (3.8%) and grassland is reduced by 
2.5 million ha (4.6%). Overall, the UAA increases 
by 3 million ha (1.7%). The expansion of the UAA 
takes place at the expense of the forestry sector. 
This effect differs across farm types depending on 
the farms’ specialisation.
As illustrated in Figure 21, the two types of 
cropping farms considered (cereals, oilseeds and 
protein crops and field cropping and mixed) show 
stronger decreases of grassland area compared 
to the two livestock farms considered (cattle 
dairying, rearing and fattening and sheep and 
other grazing livestock). The grassland area at 
livestock farms stays almost constant. The relative 
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expansion of arable land, on the other hand, is 
quite similar for all four farm types.
Further, the figure reveals that the UAA 
of these farm types is decreasing in the ME-oil 
sub-scenario because the price increase is not 
sufficient to compensate for increased costs. 
Similar results are observed for the rest of the 
farm types. Figure 22 reports more detailed land 
use effects of the ME scenario for the same farm 
types depicted in Figure 21.
According to Figure 22, the land cover 
change is much less reactive to price changes 
for livestock farms than it is for cropping 
farms. The two types of livestock farms react 
very little in terms of changes in the land 
cover, whereas we see sizeable impacts for 
the two types of cropping farms in the ME-
full and ME-GDP sub-scenarios. In particular, 
cereal production is expanded greatly due 
to higher demand for food and feed. Apart 
from the substitution effects with grassland 
and forestry described in Figure 21, cereal 
expansion is also driven by conversion of 
fallow land into production. 
The unresponsiveness of the two livestock 
farms in terms of land use does not imply that 
the higher product prices and higher input costs 
do not affect their production. Table 36 shows 
production effects for the four selected farm type 
aggregates at the EU-27 level. 
According to Table 36, the two livestock 
farm types indeed increase the production of 
animal products by approximately 6% in the 
ME-full sub-scenario. This production increase is 
Figure 21: Area effects for selected EU-25 farm type aggregates
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mainly achieved via increased stocking densities. 
Furthermore, the oil price increase generally leads 
solely to production increases for crops, whereas 
fodder activities and animal products show only 
slight production changes.
Figure 23 shows stocking density changes in 
the ME-full sub-scenario relative to the baseline. 
The beef activities are a subset of all cattle 
activities. The latter include additionally dairy and 
breeding animals. Other animal activities include 
the pig and poultry sectors as well as sheep 
and goats. For all farm types, the beef activities 
show stronger stocking density increases than 
the aggregated cattle activities. This difference 
may be due to the stronger increase in the price 
of meat than, for example, for milk products, as 
shown in Table 34. The increases in the numbers 
of other animals show even a stronger effect for 
some farm types. The category “other animals” is 
dominated by pig and poultry production, which 
are more elastic to price changes than the cattle 
sector. 
Next, we present the the income effects of 
the analysed sub-scenarios. Table 37 shows the 
decomposition of income effects into revenue, 
cost and direct payment effects on a per-hectare 
basis. The total revenues increase for all farm 
types in all scenarios. In the ME-oil sub-scenario, 
this increase is much smaller than it is in the ME-
GDP sub-scenario, which is related to the price 
effects reported in Table 34. Regarding production 
costs, the increase is higher in the ME-oil sub-
scenario because the increasing oil price directly 
impacts production costs, whereas the increasing 
Figure 22: EU-27 aggregate land use shares for selected farm types
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GDP affects agricultural costs indirectly via 
intesification and stronger demand for inputs. 
Regarding direct payments, we observe lower 
values per hectare than at baseline. This result 
is mainly due to the increase in total area while 
direct payment ceilings remain fixed, leading to 
lower average per-hectare direct payments.
The resulting income effects for all farm 
types are positive in the cases of the ME-full 
and ME-GDP sub-scenarios, whereas they are 
negative for almost all types in ME-oil. This 
result is understandable because the GDP effect 
only impacts product prices and thus increases 
revenues. The oil price increase also yields due to 
rising prices, but costs increase simultaneously. 
The latter effect dominates the revenue increase 
wherefore total income decreases. Only for farm 
types dealing with permanent crops does the oil 
price increase not have a negative impact on the 
Table 36: Production effects for EU-25 aggregated farm types
Type of Farming Baseline ME-full effect ME- oil price ME - GDP
(1000 t) %  to Baseline %  to Baseline %  to Baseline
Cereals
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 110.719 14,54 -1,33 15,67
General field cropping & mixed cropping 53.798 12,61 -1,11 13,63
Cattle-Dairying rearing and fattening 4.184 14,07 -1,05 15,30
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 2.193 19,75 -1,17 21,74
Oilseeds
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 14.160 7,42 0,91 6,39
General field cropping & mixed cropping 4.193 7,28 0,87 6,44
Cattle-Dairying rearing and fattening 158 10,83 0,17 10,62
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 99 12,25 0,22 12,04
Other arable 
crops
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 19.173 14,13 0,02 12,54
General field cropping & mixed cropping 86.314 12,57 -0,22 11,69
Cattle-Dairying rearing and fattening 1.330 10,77 0,31 10,34
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 2.077 4,74 -0,04 4,83
Vegetables and 
Permanent crops
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 11.040 2,80 0,12 2,71
General field cropping & mixed cropping 12.336 2,59 0,15 2,45
Cattle-Dairying rearing and fattening 4.209 5,48 0,58 4,92
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 8.979 4,95 0,30 4,68
Fodder activities
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 37.745 -7,63 0,09 -8,14
General field cropping & mixed cropping 54.865 -3,28 -0,54 -3,08
Cattle-Dairying rearing and fattening 315.249 4,96 -0,89 6,14
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 161.644 5,53 -0,75 6,78
All cattle 
activities
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 214 4,17 0,48 3,55
General field cropping & mixed cropping 290 3,81 0,35 3,39
Cattle-Dairying rearing and fattening 1.737 6,10 -0,35 6,35
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 324 5,32 -0,53 5,69
Beef meat 
activities
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 327 2,58 0,77 1,59
General field cropping & mixed cropping 356 3,54 0,58 2,80
Cattle-Dairying rearing and fattening 3.429 4,53 -0,72 5,11
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 722 2,23 -1,18 3,10
Other animals
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 5.346 13,51 0,01 13,47
General field cropping & mixed cropping 15.491 14,80 0,41 14,36
Cattle-Dairying rearing and fattening 2.246 12,44 -0,19 12,56
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 5.249 8,97 -0,20 9,06
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total income. This difference might be due to 
the fact that permanent crops are more labour 
intensive than capital intensive. As a result, 
production costs are less reactive to oil price 
changes. 
Conclusions
In this scenario, we have simulated the 
macroeconomic environment scenario by 
considering two shocks:
(1) ME-oil: increase in the baseline crude oil 
price by 50%, impacting agricultural input 
costs and
(2) ME-GDP: increase in the national GDPs by 
16% compared to the baseline, inducing 
an increase in the demand for agricultural 
commodities. 
Furthermore, the combined effect of both 
hypotheses was simulated. Generally, it is observed 
that the considered shocks lead to increasing 
commodity prices and thus increasing revenues 
for farmers. An increase in the annual world 
GDP growth rate by 1% (or a 16% cumulative 
increase over the period of 2005-2020) relative 
to the baseline causes stronger price effects (up to 
30%) than the 50% increase in oil price does (up 
to only 7%). This difference exists because the oil 
price effect on agricultural commodity prices is 
only indirect. It directly impacts production costs, 
which lead indirectly to increasing prices. As a 
result, in the ME-oil scenario, farmers are affected 
by two opposing market effects: an increase in 
production costs and a decrease in revenues. 
In most cases, increasing costs dominate such 
that the farm’s income declines. This result 
is, of course, driven by assumptions on price 
transmission elasticities. But the observations that 
price increases for agricultural commodities stay 
far behind the oil price increase and that farmers’ 
Figure 23: Relative stocking density changes in the ME-full scenario
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income declines with increasing oil prices are not 
likely to change if price transmission elasticities 
are increased or decreased. 
The effect of higher GDP on income across 
farm types is generally positive due to the 
increasing demand for agricultural products, 
which generates an increase in the price of 
agricultural commodities. The income increases 
the range from approximately 10% for farms 
growing permanent crops up to about 70% for 
farms producing cattle for milk and meat. Even 
crop farms show income increases of about 
50%. 
Table 37: Income effects for EU-25 aggregated farm types
Type of Farming Baseline Full effect oil price GDP Baseline
Full 
effect
Oil price GDP
€/ha %  to 
Baseline
%  to 
Baseline
%  to 
Baseline
€/ha %  to 
Baseline
%  to 
Baseline
%  to 
Baseline
Re
ve
nu
es
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 755 29 2,5 26
Pr
em
iu
m
s
305 -2 0,4 -2
General field cropping & mixed cropping 747 28 2,6 26 342 -1 0,5 -2
Horticulture 772 30 2,2 27 955 5 0,9 4
Vineyards 692 26 2,3 24 276 -2 0,3 -2
Fruit and citrus fruit 386 55 1,4 54 1043 3 0,4 3
Olives 520 27 1,6 25 546 -2 0,3 -2
Permanent crops combined 526 23 2,0 21 622 -1 0,3 -1
Dairying 673 30 3,1 27 385 -1 0,4 -1
Cattle- dairying rearing and fattening 574 30 2,9 27 307 -2 0,3 -2
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 541 31 2,8 28 326 -5 0,4 -6
Granivores 581 33 2,0 31 329 -2 0,2 -2
Mixed livestock 421 33 2,2 31 272 -1 0,5 -1
Mixed crops-livestock 666 31 2,5 28 318 -1 0,3 -1
<16 ESU 449 32 2,0 30 290 -2 0,5 -2
>16 - <100 ESU 719 28 2,7 25 327 -2 0,4 -2
>100 ESU 869 30 2,7 27 332 -1 0,4 -1
To
ta
l C
os
t
Cereals, oilseed and protein crops 733 17 13,3 3
In
co
m
e
327 26 -23,5 51
General field cropping & mixed cropping 738 17 13,3 4 351 22 -22,0 45
Horticulture 875 19 12,0 6 852 14 -9,3 24
Vineyards 707 16 13,3 3 261 24 -29,5 55
Fruit and citrus fruit 280 21 13,3 7 1150 16 -2,4 19
Olives 350 24 14,1 8 716 6 -5,5 12
Permanent crops combined 441 20 14,2 5 707 4 -7,1 12
Dairying 854 18 13,3 4 204 23 -44,7 69
Cattle- dairying rearing and fattening 721 18 13,3 4 161 26 -48,4 76
Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 555 19 13,0 5 312 16 -17,9 35
Granivores 714 20 12,3 7 196 21 -38,5 63
Mixed livestock 500 19 12,8 5 193 22 -27,5 51
Mixed crops-livestock 734 18 13,1 4 249 28 -31,3 60
<16 ESU 453 19 13,1 5 287 18 -17,0 36
>16 - <100 ESU 750 17 13,3 4 295 23 -26,9 51
>100 ESU 899 18 13,2 4 302 32 -31,2 65
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Because the GDP effect on farmers’ 
income is so strong, the combined effect in the 
ME-full scenario is still positive and averages 
approximately 20% across farm types. 
In all scenarios, farmers react to the new 
macro environment with adjustments of their 
production programmes. Thus, the effect of 
the ME-oil sub-scenario is small, whereas the 
ME-GDP sub-scenario leads to an increase in 
arable land and intensification of crop and 
animal production activities. Furthermore, 
a tendency to substitute grassland for arable 
land can be observed for farms that do 
not specialise in cattle or sheep and goat 
production.
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The main aim of using the CAPRI farm type 
model in this study was to improve policy impact 
assessments by considering farm structural 
characteristics, such as farm size, crop mix, 
stocking density and yields. Consideration of 
such characteristics considerably reduces the 
aggregation bias and thus improves the reliability 
of regional results. This farm modelling approach 
also allows the analysis of scenario effects at a 
more disaggregated level according to farm 
specialisation and farm size. The simulation 
analyses at the farm level are particularly 
important for the direct payment scenario due to 
the farm-specific implementation of decoupled 
payments in the CAP.
However, the results presented in this report 
must be analysed in the context of the modelling 
assumptions used within the CAPRI-FT. The use 
of stylised template models that are structurally 
identical and express differences between 
farm types and regions solely by differences 
in parameters might fall short of capturing the 
full diversity of farming systems in Europe. In 
particular, this is the case for the evaluation of 
policy measures that impact farm management 
decisions, such as manure handling, feeding 
practices and farm demand behaviour, but 
this concern is less important for the flat-rate 
scenarios. 
The relatively simple representation of 
agricultural technology in the CAPRI model 
compared to approaches that are parameterised 
based on biophysical models may understate the 
farms’ response to natural and local constraints. 
However, the current structure of the approach 
provides a good balance between increased 
details about the represented farm types and the 
robustness of the model results.
The CAPRI farm-type layer provides a 
complementary approach to alternative farm-type 
approaches. Its strength rests, first, in the fact that 
harmonised data sources and assumptions are 
applied across Europe; second, the farm layer is 
transparently linked with a complex agricultural 
trade model so that the full range of CAP measures 
and their interactions can be analysed at the farm 
level; and third, its maintenance and application 
are cheaper compared to alternative approaches 
should full coverage of the EU be desired.
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Abstract
This study presents a quantitative policy impact analysis of alternative policy and macroeconomic 
assumptions in the agricultural farming sector. Three scenarios are considered: direct payment scenario, 
macroeconomic environment scenario and WTO scenario. We apply the CAPRI-Farm model, an extension 
of CAPRI which disaggregates the standard Nuts2 regional resolution of the supply models in CAPRI further 
to farm type models, capturing farm heterogeneity in terms of farm specialization and farm size across all 
EU regions and MS. The advantage of the CAPRI-Farm model compared to other similar models is that it 
represents comprehensively all major farm types in the EU and it links farm level behaviour with output 
and input market price responses. 
The direct payment scenario assumes equalisation of decoupled payments – a regional flat-rate scheme 
– at the Nuts1, MS and EU levels. According to simulation results, the value of re-distributed payments 
vary strongly between the three flat-rate systems. The value of payments reallocated between farms in the 
EU increases from 9% (3.7 billion €) of the total CAP budget in the Nuts1 scenario to 19% (8.2 billion 
€) in the EU flat-rate scenario. Particularly negatively affected are large- and medium-sized farms and 
dairies, mixed crops and livestock, general field and mixed cropping, olives, cereals and oilseeds and 
permanent crops. Small farms tend to be less affected. However, sheep, goats and grazing, the residual 
farm category and mixed livestock farms realise higher premiums and incomes. The study shows relatively 
minor allocative market responses and thus small price effects for all three scenarios.
The WTO scenario aims to quantify the impact of trade liberalization on farming sector. More precisely, 
the scenario considers the impact of the proposal made by the chair of the WTO’s agriculture negotiations, 
Ambassador Crawford Falconer. The simulation results show that tariff reduction increases consumer 
welfare in the EU by 8.5 billion €, whereas agricultural income decreases by 6.8 billion € (-3%), mainly 
driven by losses realised in the animal sector. The analyses show sizable impacts on farm income for 
different farm types. Generally, farm types specialised in livestock production lose the most. The largest 
negative income effects were observed for cattle, dairying, rearing and fattening, dairy, mixed crops and 
livestock; and sheep and goat farms.
The macroeconomic environment scenario simulates the farm-level effects of a hypothetical economic 
recovery scenario that may lead to higher GDP growth and higher oil prices. Two shocks are assumed: an 
increase in the crude oil price by 50% and an annual world GDP growth rate increase by 1% relative to 
the baseline level. The results indicate that a higher GDP growth causes stronger price and market effects 
than does the increase in the oil price. With the oil price shock, farmers are affected by two opposing 
effects: an increase in production costs and an increase in revenues. In most cases, increasing costs 
dominate such that the overall farm income declines. The effect of higher GDP on income across farm 
types is generally positive due to the rising demand for agricultural products, which generates an increase 
in the prices of agricultural commodities. Farmers react to the new macro environment with adjustments 
of their production leading to an increase in arable land and intensification of crop and animal production 
activities. Further, a tendency to substitute grassland for arable land can be observed.
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